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 The first chapter examines the effect of the composition of federal and state 
government spending on SO2 air concentrations in the US. The results indicate that a 
reallocation of spending from RME to PME at the state and local level reduces sulfur 
dioxide concentrations while the composition of federal spending has no effect. A 
10% percent increase in the share of PME spending reduces sulfur dioxide 
concentrations by the range of 3 to 5% for state and local spending. This is a 
significant effect since sulfur dioxide concentrations have been falling at an annual 
average rate of 5% from 1980 to 2008. The results are robust to various sensitivity 
checks. 
 
The second chapter documents the creation of a US government spending 
allocation database that provides new data on a set of disaggregated government 
spending categories covering all the states in the US for the period 1983-2008.  The 
data allows for the comparison of federal versus state and local government spending 
 
 
over time on various spending items. This is achieved by categorizing and 
aggregating expenditures for over 1,500 federal programs and combining data on 
state and local government spending. The key challenge in separating federal and 
state and local government spending is the issue of double counting since part of state 
and local spending is from the federal government. The dataset presented will aid 
researchers in separately accounting for both state and local, as well as federal 
spending in future research.  
 
Finally, the third chapter examines fiscal spending and economic growth in 
the presence of imperfect markets. Political economy factors tend to induce many 
governments to spend on private goods (RME) to the detriment of spending on social 
and public goods (PME). This bias in spending patterns is particularly costly for 
economic growth when capital markets are imperfect. A theoretical model on 
government spending and growth is developed and linked quite closely to an 
empirical model. The empirical results fully corroborate the hypothesis that spending 
biases in favor of non-social subsidies (RME) reduce the rate of economic over the 
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Chapter 1: Government Spending and Sulfur Dioxide Air 
Pollution in the US 
 




Government spending is economically justified for certain activities where externalities 
or credit market failures exist. However a significant portion of government spending has 
little economic justification. This paper explores the environmental implications when a 
government embarks on broad fiscal policy changes, altering the composition of 
government expenditures towards correcting market imperfections and increasing the 
provision of public goods. This paper specifically investigates the impact of US 
government spending on US sulfur dioxide concentrations for the time period 1985-2008. 
The effect of government spending is examined at the state and local level, as well as 
federal expenditures.  
 
Productive and wasteful government spending are distinguished by creating two 
categories – government spending on market-promoting goods (PME) and spending on 
market restricting goods (RME). PME spending encompasses pure public goods, which 
are non-rival and non-excludable, and spending that alleviates market failures. Under this 
characterization, government expenditures on health, education, affordable housing, 
social welfare, environment, and research and development are considered PME 
expenditures. Research and development spending fall under PME spending due to the 
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positive externalities generated by R & D activities and the tendency for the private 
sector to under-invest in them. RME spending involves subsidies to firms for activities 
such as product promotion, commodity market subsidies, grants to corporations, bailouts 
of failed private financial institutions etc. PME expenditures promote activities where 
government intervention is justified, and thus are considered productive government 
spending. In contrast, RME spending tends to crowd out private investment and 
encourage inefficient rent-seeking (hence market-restricting). Thus RME expenditures 
are deemed as wasteful spending. The classification presented here is not novel and has 
been presented in the literature (López, Galinato, and Islam 2011; López and Galinato, 
2007). 
 
The set of broad fiscal spending categories described above can affect the environment 
via the following mechanisms. PME expenditures tend to promote human capital 
intensive activities while RME expenditures tend to promote more physical capital 
intensive economic activities, thus, a reallocation from RME to PME would improve 
environmental quality via a composition effect. On the other hand such a reallocation 
may increase economic activity, effectively increasing pollution via a scale effect. The 
reallocation from RME to PME may increase incomes resulting in a higher demand for 
environmental quality, or promote R&D that generates pollution-saving technologies. 
Such a reallocation of spending may also alter the consumption mix towards less 
pollution intensive goods making pollution abatement much easier (see Seldon and Song, 
1995; Orecchia and Tessitore, 2011). Finally reallocating spending from RME to PME 
may increase the awareness of pollution and its harmful effects thereby reducing 
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pollution (McConnell, 1997; Ferrer-i-carbonell et al., 2004). Electric utilities account for 
two thirds of sulfur dioxide emissions in the US. Given the range of output elasticities in 
the literature for energy and electricity (see Table A17), we expect macro-economic 
factors to have an impact on SO2 emissions.  
 
An empirical question is whether the effects of a reallocation spending from PME to 
RME on the environment are stronger at the state and local or federal government. On 
one hand, proponents of spending at the federal level point out race to the bottom 
scenarios, inter-state externalities, or claim that state governments do not have the level 
of expertise to carry out fiscal policy effectively for certain items, and may have soft 
budgets with the expectation of federal bailouts. On the other hand, States are likely to be 
more representative of its citizen’s preferences, be subject to less red tape, be open to 
more experimentation with policy and also have a higher degree of accountability (Tanzi, 
1995). Because fiscal policy has varying goals, spending compositional changes that 
achieve environmental improvements is not necessarily indicative of the efficiency of 
spending as a whole.  Differences between federal and state spending reallocation that 
improves the environment can be interpreted as certain mechanisms linking broad fiscal 
spending to environment outcomes may be stronger or weaker depending on the level of 
government. For instance, state governments may be better providers of public goods, 
and thus a reallocation of RME spending to PME at the state level may result in a greater 




The use of Sulfur dioxide air concentrations in this study is ideal for four reasons: (i) It is 
a pollutant generated by production activities and thus amenable to the mechanisms 
linking fiscal policy and environmental outcomes, (ii) Sulfur dioxide regulation by the 
EPA is tractable, especially via regulation of utilities,  (iii) Data for sulfur dioxide 
concentrations are comprehensive and available for a large period of time over a large 
number of sites across states, and (iv) Studies have shown that Sulfur Dioxide  air 
pollution is highly correlated with other local pollutants such as Particulate Matter (PM 
2.5) and may also be a precursor to global pollutants (Ward, 2009; Kim et al., 2005).  
 
This study adds to a long literature that has examined the determinants of air pollutants in 
the US. A few studies have examined the impact of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
on PM10 concentrations (Aufhammer et al., 2009; Aufhammer et al.,2011), while others 
have examined the effects of regulation on Ozone (Henderson, 1996), and more recently 
SO2 concentrations (Carlson et. al, 2000; Greenstone, 2004). In addition to regulation, 
community characteristics have also been found to be significant determinants of 
pollutants (Brooks and Sethi, 1997). There are no studies that have specifically examined 
the effect of the composition of government spending on air pollution in the US, and this 
study fills that gap in the literature.  
 
This study builds on López, Galinato, and Islam (2011), which explores a similar 
relationship between government spending composition and pollution across countries. 
Focusing on the US alone allows for a breakdown of the composition of government 
spending by the state and federal level. In addition, a more precise categorization of 
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government spending is accomplished using more disaggregated data. As far as I know, 
this is the first study to examine the composition of spending by different levels of 
government on air pollution in general. This is possible due to the creation of a new panel 
dataset of government expenditures spanning all states, covering the time period of 1983 
to 2008  (Islam, 2011). One limitation of López, Galinato, and Islam (2011) is that it is 
difficult to account for regulation in cross-country studies. By restricting the study to the 
US, this paper is able to account for air pollution regulation policy and also take 
advantage of the comprehensive data available for US SO2 concentrations in terms of 
coverage over geographic location and time. Also, a new estimation model is used to 
capture state specific time varying unobservables using state specific polynomials of a 
time trend, building on estimations used in literature (Cornwell et al., 1990; Jacobsen et 
al., 1993; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). 
 
This study provides a timely exploration of an important link between government 
spending policy and an environmental outcome. The 2008-2009 financial crisis has put 
US fiscal policy in the forefront of much debate and scrutiny. Thus it is important to 
understand the consequences on the environment of broad compositional changes in 
fiscal spending in response to the crisis. This study finds that a reallocation of spending 
from RME to PME at the state and local level reduces sulfur dioxide concentrations while 
the composition of federal spending has no effect. A 10% percent increase in the share of 
PME spending reduces sulfur dioxide concentrations by the range of 3 to 5% for state and 
local spending. This is a significant effect since sulfur dioxide concentrations have been 
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falling at an annual average rate of 5% from 1980 to 2008. The results are robust to 
various sensitivity checks1.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the empirical 
environmental literature on the determinants of pollutants. Section 3 provides an 
overview of trends of sulfur dioxide pollution and regulations implemented in the US. 
Section 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 provides the conceptual framework, econometric model, data 
description, results, and conclusions respectively. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The early empirical environment literature on the determinants of pollutants focused on 
the relationship between income and pollution across countries (Shafik and 
Bandhopadhyay, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1995), with a few studies specific to the 
US (List and Gallet, 1999; Khanna, 2002). An inverted U relationship between income 
and pollution was traced across countries, which a few recent studies found to be non-
robust (Deacon and Norman, 2007). Empirical studies have examined the relationship 
between environmental regulation and air pollution in the US (Aufhammer et al., 2009; 
Aufhammer et al., 2011; Carlson et. al, 2000; Greenstone, 2004; Henderson, 1996) and 
the link between community characteristics and air pollution (Brooks and Sethi, 1997).  
 
                                                     
1 An alternate approach to the current study would be use CGE models as carried out in the literature 
(Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990). However, CGE models depend upon strong assumptions and lack of data 
precludes econometric estimation of key supply and demand parameters. Also, CGE models are more 
effective for global than local pollutants (Bergman, 2005). 
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A strand of the literature has focused on identifying the channels through which macro-
economic factors or policies may affect environmental outcomes.  A decomposition of 
the various proximate determinants of pollution by which trade impacts environmental 
outcomes is conducted by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001). The proximate factors 
identified are the scale, technique, and composition effects. The scale effect refers to 
when the economy grows, economic activity increases, which in turn may increase 
pollution levels. The technique effect refers to the reduction in the pollution intensity 
(pollution per unit of output) of an economy. The income effect refers to when incomes 
rise, assuming environmental quality is a normal good, individuals may demand better 
environmental quality. Consequently, tighter environmentally policy may be enacted to 
match the greater demand for less pollution. Also this may result in pollution-saving 
technology. Independent of income, technological change may also occur towards cleaner 
modes of production, which may reduce pollution, thus the technique effect results in a 
decline in pollution.  
 
Finally there is the composition effect. An economy with a higher composition of dirty 
industries will have higher levels of pollution than an economy with a lower composition 
of dirty industries. Thus, pollution declines when an economy shifts from dirty to cleaner 
industries. Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) examine how trade impacts the 
environment through the three proximate determinants. Their findings indicate that 
although trade works through the scale effect to increase pollution, the income effect 




The empirical environmental literature has focused on the role of government in three 
ways – political economy, size of government, and more recently the composition of 
government spending. Empirical studies have quantified the indirect influence of 
government on environmental outcomes by exploring whether political variables 
constitute a significant part of the income effect. The central idea is that a more 
democratic government with less corruption is more likely to consider a policy change 
when consumers vote for more environmental protection. Barrett and Grady (2000) find 
that politically free economies perform better in reducing pollution concentrations, 
although political freedom does not account for all of the income effect.  
 
The size of the government is another significant concern. There are several theories of 
government with a similar thread of underlying logic. Governments can act as a public 
good provider and a corrector of externalities, or they can be a provider of services for 
special interest groups, or in general provide goods and services that deviate from their 
citizens’ preferences. Thus, one interpretation of the effect of total government 
expenditures on pollution would be as an indicator of whether governments provide a 
certain public good (pollution alleviation), or provide non-public goods (worsen 
pollution). Bernauer and Koubi (2006) use total government expenditures over GDP as a 
proxy for size and estimate its effect on SO2 concentrations for 42 countries, from 1971 
to 1996. They find that government size has a positive effect on SO2 concentrations. One 
limitation of this study is that it cannot say whether this positive relationship is because 
governments are inefficiently providing public goods, or providing non-public goods for 
9 
 
special interests. An examination of the composition of government expenditures would 
address this. 
 
A recent study by López, Galinato, and Islam (2011) provides a theoretical foundation for 
the relationship between the composition of fiscal spending and environmental outcomes. 
Using cross country level data, the study finds that altering the composition of 
government spending towards social expenditures and public good expenditures reduces 
several air and water pollutants.  As mentioned in the introduction, the present study adds 
to López, Galinato, and Islam (2011) by breaking the composition of government 
spending by the state and federal level, and then examining the impact of fiscal spending 
on SO2 concentrations in the US.  
 
3. Sulfur Dioxide Sources, Regulation, and Trends 
 
In this section I provide a brief overview of the sources of sulfur dioxide emissions and 
air pollution regulations. Overall sulfur dioxide emissions have been declining since 1983 
(figure 1). Around two thirds of sulfur dioxide emissions stem from fuel combustion from 
electric power plants (Table A1). The second largest contributor is fuel combustion from 
industrial activities (mostly coal and oil industries). Over time, the overall contribution of 
fuel combustion activities towards SO2 emissions has remained fairly stable around 83%, 
although a decline in contribution from electric utilities have been offset by increases in 
fuel combustion activities. The largest increase in SO2 emissions contribution has been 




Initially air pollution regulation in the United States was under state and local 
governments. The Clean Air Act in 1963, followed by the Air Quality Act of 1967 
provided funds from the federal government to state and local governments for support 
and regulation of air pollution. However, the lack of enforcement and several delays in 
formulating standards by states led to the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970. This 
engendered the EPA as well as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), 
signaling federal involvement in air pollution control in the US. National air quality 
standards were published for six pollutants: Sulfur oxides, particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, photochemical oxides (ground level Ozone), nitrogen oxides, and 
hydrocarbons (mostly via Ozone standards). A big factor in the change of sulfur 
emissions has been the regulation of electric utilities. Coal-fired power plants built after 
1978 were required to install scrubbers (flue gas desulfurization equipment) as according 
to the New Sources Performance Standards (NSPS) in order to reduce SO2 emissions, 
while power plants built before 1978 were subject to a maximum emission rate standard.  
 
The largest piece of regulation however came in the form of the 1990 amendments of the 
Clean Air Act of 1970. The 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act involved more 
stringent regulation and the setting of tighter air quality standards. However, the 
significant piece of legislation with regards to SO2 would be the Title IV of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments also known as the Acid Rain Program (Carlson et. al, 2000).  In order 
to regulate acid deposition (acid rain) a two stage emission strategy was imposed to 
reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides produced from electric utilities. Phase I, 
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implemented in 1995, involved issuing allowances to power plants, which resulted in 
fines if exceeded. Phase II (began in 2000) imposed tighter caps on phase I plants while 
emission limits were imposed on cleaner smaller plants. Permits were allowed to be 
traded and thus the term, Cap and Trade.  The impact of Title IV can be observed in 
figure 1 where there is a larger decline in SO2 emissions around 1994 and 1995.  
 
Given that electric utilities are a significance source of SO2 emissions, the impact of 
macroeconomic policy such as government fiscal policy depends on the industrial output 
elasticity of both energy and electricity in the US. To elaborate, under the case of low 
output elasticities of energy, if a reallocation of government spending from RME to PME 
alters the composition of the economy towards cleaner industries at the cost of dirty 
industries, the impact on electricity usage by the dirty sector may be small, thus the effect 
on the two thirds of sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utilities may be limited. Some 
empirical estimates of output elasticities in the literature have been found to be close to 
one, or as high as 1.57 (See Table A17). Thus, we expect government spending to have 
an impact on energy use and hence SO2 emissions. Furthermore the fact that SO2 
emissions from non-road vehicles tend not to be regulated, they may be more responsive 
to changes in the composition of government spending policy. 
4. Conceptual Framework 
 
In this section I provide a detailed explanation of the spending dichotomy used in this 
study. I then sketch out the theoretical model similar to López, Galinato, and Islam 
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(2011) to show the mechanisms by which the compositional shifts in government 




The classification of productive and wasteful government spending is derived from 
López and Galinato (2007). Productive and wasteful government spending is defined by 
two categories – government spending on market-promoting goods (PME) and spending 
on market restricting goods (RME).  PME spending achieves two objectives (i) alleviates 
the effects of market failure or (ii) increases the provision of pure public goods. Under 
this categorization, PME spending includes social subsidies such as education, health, 
social transfers, as well as expenditures in R & D, knowledge diffusion, and conventional 
public goods.  
 
PME expenditures tend to complement rather than substitute private investments and also 
mitigate the effects of market failures, especially credit market failures, which affect a 
large number of households (Attanasio et. al., 2008; Grant, 2007; Jappelli 1990; Zeldes, 
1989).  Social subsidies specifically may alleviate liquidity constraints faced by 
households and therefore increase investment in education and health, which have large 
positive externalities but tend to be underinvested (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Similarly the 
private sector under-invests in R & D activities, which generate positive externalities, and 
also has little incentives to spend in environmental protection, which faces substantial 
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market failures (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000; Dasgupta, 1996)2. Conventional public goods, 
such as legal institutions including law and order are typically underinvested by the 
private sector, and thus government spending in such activities is merited. 
 
RME spending usually fall under “development” or “economic affairs” expenditures that 
involve subsidies directly to firms for activities such as product promotion, commodity 
market subsidies, grants to corporations, bailouts of failed private financial institutions 
etc. Such expenditures typically tend to promote capital intensive industries, or substitute 
private investment as they are typically captured by large corporations, which are 
typically financially unconstrained (Slivinski, 2007). The costs and ineffectiveness of 
subsidies that fall under RME spending has been well documented (Coady et. al. 2006). 
For example the Savings and Loans crisis of the 1980s is estimated to have directly cost 
US taxpayers $150 billion over the period 1989-1992 (Curry and Shibut, 2000). 
Furthermore, the availability of RME spending tends to promote directly unproductive, 
profit-seeking activities (DUP) such as lobbying, by mainly special interest groups. RME 
spending tends to elicit more rent-seeking activities as firms are fewer than households, 
and can be grouped by production activity and thus can more easily solve the collective 




                                                     
2 There is a possibility that public R&D spending may crowd out private R&D spending. However, overall 
this literature is not conclusive and the results are ambiguous (David et al., 2000). 
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In this section I describe the theoretical model linking government spending to pollution 
formalized in López, Galinato, and Islam (2011). The model captures the following 
observations. Production pollution tends to be generated by the industrial sector, which is 
typically capital intensive. In contrast, service sectors and sectors that produce human 
capital (henceforth knowledge sector) are relatively cleaner and less capital intensive. 
Given the components of PME spending such as health and education, government 
spending in PME contributes more to the output of the clean ( cy ) and knowledge ( h ) 
sectors, and contributes relatively less to the dirty sector ( dy ). On the other hand 
Government spending in RME tends to be concentrated towards the dirty sector.  
 
Define g as PME spending by the government and x as spending in RME (total 
government spending G = x + g).  We make the following assumptions in the theoretical 
framework. First, the economy is small and trades freely in the international markets for 
final goods; domestic factor and output markets are perfectly competitive. Second, we 
assume η ≤ Ω ≤ μ ≤ 1 where η,Ω, andμ and are the output elasticities of g in the dirty 
sector,  clean sector, and knowledge sector respectively. For simplicity we assume that 
capital (k) is an input only in the dirty sector, which is a source of pollution (Z) and is a 
perfect substitute for government spending in RME (x).  
 




(1)    1 ( ) ( )d dy D hl Z x k g
α β α β η− −= +  
(2)    c cy Ahl g
Ω=  
(3)                                              rh Bl g
μ= , 
where ld , lc , lr  are  labor in the dirty sector, clean, and knowledge sectors respectively 
( ihl is effective labor in units of efficiency for the i
th sector), and α>0, β>0, α+β < 1. D, A, 
and B are positive parameters and are the total factor productivities for the dirty, clean 
and knowledge sectors respectively.  
 
Producers in the dirty sector minimize the cost of production by choosing a combination 
of effective labor, hld, and the dirty input, Z, given g, x and k.   The dual cost function for 
the dirty sector is: 
(4)    ( )
11
1 ( ) dC w x k g y
α β ηα β
α β α β α β α βα βφ α β α τ
+ − −
− + + + ++= + + , 
where 
1
D ( / )
β
α β α βφ α β
−
+ +≡ , w is the wage rate per unit of efficiency labor in the dirty 
sector (hld) and τ is the pollution tax rate. Using Shepherd’s Lemma, the dirty input 
demand is, 
(5)                        ( )
11
 ( / ) d
CZ g w x k y
η α α β








The explicit expression for yd is substituted into (5) and then logarithmically 
differentiated to obtain the following equation: 
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Equation (6) shows the effect of a compositional shift of spending from RME (x) 
spending to PME (g) spending on pollution. Thus total government spending (G) is fixed.  
 
From equation (6) we identify four partial effects of the compositional shift from RME 
spending to PME on pollution: 
 
(i) The direct effect: As indicated by the first term in equation (6), the direct effect of 
an increase in g and a decrease in x is negative. This means that the same level of 
the dirty output can be produced with fewer dirty inputs when g increases holding 
all other factors constant. This can be attributed to R and D spending or 
improvements in air pollution abatement, also known as the technique effect. 
 
(ii)  Scale Effect:  A higher g  increases labor productivity, which in turn, may affect 
the level of the dirty output holding all other factors constant. Since a rise in g 
increases productivity in all sectors, a priori it is not possible to tell whether this 
scale effect will increase or decrease dirty sector output. If this effect causes 
production of the dirty output to increase (decrease), this effect will be pollution-




(iii) Input Composition Effects: The third and the forth terms in equation (6) are 
essentially input composition effects. The third term indicates that a higher g 
raises the economy’s wage rate, which increases pollution since labor and 
pollution are substitutes. The fourth terms shows that an increase in g reduces x, 
which implies a lower level of total capital used in production. Given a constant 
output level, the fall in total capital must be compensated with an increase in all 
variable inputs including pollution, therefore increasing pollution.  
 
(iv) Environmental regulation or income effect. If public and social goods are 
productive, the increase in g and concomitant reduction of x  may have a positive 
net effect on national income. This may increase the demand for regulation in the 
economy thus reducing pollution.  
 
An increase in PME spending may change the composition of consumption goods, as 
consumption is shifted towards less polluting goods. For example, increasing PME 
spending may result in greater investments in public transportation, resulting in 
consumers altering their preferences away from private forms of transportation that are 
typically energy intensive, and thus reduce sulfur dioxide emissions (Shapiro et al., 2004; 
Zimmerman, 2005). Increasing the share of PME spending may also increase R&D 
promoting the consumption of more energy saving goods such as energy saving bulbs 
and energy saving AC and heating units etc. Moreover, human capital spending is a 
sizeable component of PME spending. Increases in human capital may heighten pollution 
awareness among the general public resulting in a decrease in pollution intensive 
activities (McConnell, 1997). Using household surveys in Netherlands, Ferrer-i-carbonell 
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et al., (2004), find that increasing public awareness of pollution changes consumer 
expenditures towards more sustainable consumption.  
 
The overall effect of altering the composition of spending from RME to PME will depend 
on which of the above effects dominate.  Now I turn the issue of spending efficiency and 
the importance of examining fiscal policy at the federal and local levels. 
 
Government Efficiency and Federal versus Local Spending 
 
There are several concerns about direct inefficiency of specific government spending in 
achieving their targets.  For instance government spending towards improving school 
quality may be used inefficiently and thus have limited impact in raising the quality or 
quantity of education. Empirically, this is less of a concern if the inefficiencies in both 
PME and RME spending are equivalent. This is due to the fact that impact of a 
reallocation of spending from RME to PME will not be debilitated if the inefficiencies of 
both types of spending are the same. Of course, the additional assumption is that 
reallocation of government spending does not affect the inefficiencies of each type of 
spending. 
 
There is no reason a priori to expect the direct inefficiency of one type of spending to be 
larger than the other. It is likely that government assistance through either type of 
spending can induce strategic behavior (such as moral hazard) on the part of recipients. 
An example of strategic behavior would be firms or individuals refusing to move away 
from an environmentally hazardous area due to compensation from the government. Such 
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compensation may come in the form of subsidies and is usually to compensate for the 
damages faced by individuals or firms. Along similar lines of reasoning, social subsidies 
such as welfare programs can be abused by similar strategic behavior. 
 
Just as well, strategic behavior due to RME spending may incur great costs. RME 
subsidies tend to target specific individuals or groups, in contrast to PME spending, 
which benefits a larger portion of the population. Thus it is difficult for a diverse group of 
individuals to band together and form a sufficiently strong lobby. In other words, the 
diversity in the incentives of the population makes it difficult to solve the collective 
agency problem. As stated earlier, industries are typically located near each other and 
share strong interests, making it easier to form strong lobbies that promote their interests. 
Therefore RME spending tends to encourage greater unproductive rent-seeking activities 
than PME spending. This is evident with the US government’s history in giving out 
corporate bailouts3. Given the potential direct inefficiencies of PME and RME spending, 
a priori it is difficult to say whether strategic behavior towards PME spending is more or 
less efficient than strategic behavioral responses to RME spending. 
 
It is also important to note that the goal of broad fiscal policy is not necessarily to 
improve environmental outcomes. Thus conclusions about the efficiency of broad fiscal 
spending cannot be drawn from any positive or negative effect of fiscal policy on 
                                                     
3 There are a few caveats however. The difficulty in forming lobby groups for public expenditures may be 
a virtue of the definition and classification of such expenditures. Consequently there may be lobby groups 
easily formed around components of government spending in public goods. Examples would be lobbying 
that occurs for allocation of transportation expenditures, as well as environmental protection. However, the 
fact that it is hard to imagine the formation of lobbies for food stamps lends credence for weaker lobbies 
when compared to industrial lobby groups.  
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environmental outcomes. The main concern is that specific inefficiencies in particular 
government spending programs may weaken the mechanisms by which broad fiscal 
policy affects environmental outcomes. However, fiscal revenues devoted towards RME 
spending at the expense of PME spending are an indication of allocative inefficiency. 
Thus we can empirically test the effect of allocative inefficiency of government spending 
on environment outcomes. 
 
The impact of a compositional shift in government spending may also depend on the 
level of government that provides the public good. The key hypothesis is whether 
spending directly by federal governments, or expenditures by state expenditures have 
been more effective in achieving their targets. This is part of a large literature on fiscal 
federalism. One concern is the potential for race to the bottom scenarios when state or 
local government carry out fiscal policy. For instance, state governments may have 
disincentives to provide social programs given the open nature of their economies due to 
the fear that they may attract poor individuals and thus limiting their tax revenue base 
(Oates, 1999).  Thus it is also likely that state level governments may engage in spending 
that is more likely to attract businesses. Competition to attract firms may induce greater 
RME spending and thus lead to race to the bottom scenarios. Furthermore, federal 
governments may have the technical expertise to carry out fiscal policy while state 
governments may face soft budgets in anticipation of federal bailouts. In contrast, state 
and local governments, being nearer to their constituencies, may be more responsive to 
the particular preferences and thus be able to better provide these services. Also Oates 
(2001) argues that in terms of environmental policy, federal government involvement 
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should mainly entail subsidies for abatement technology, research and development, and 
information dissemination. The variation in efficiency by level of government may affect 
various spending items, which in turn may affect the environment via the mechanisms 
described in the conceptual model. 
The dataset used in this study is able to disaggregate government spending in PME by 
level of delivery. For instance this study is able to distinguish between total government 
spending carried out at the state and local level versus spending at the federal level 
independent of state governments. Thus the empirical question of whether a reallocation 
of government spending from RME to PME at the state and local or federal level 
government has a larger impact on the environment is explored.  
 
5.  Econometric Model  
 
The log differences in Sulfur dioxide concentrations, jstz , at monitoring site j , state s , 
averaged over year t , are determined by the differences in the stock of PME and RME 
goods provided by the government4.  This relationship is expressed in differences as 
reliable measures of the expenditure flows towards PME and RME exist. The annual 
differences of government stock are approximated by the level of corresponding 
government spending.  We make further normalizations of the variables of interest as 
follows. stPME  is divided by total government expenditures, defining 
                                                     
4 To be specific, log difference refers to the difference in the log of SO2 concentrations. Thus 
1ln lnjst jst jstz Z Z −≡ − where jstZ is SO2 concentrations at monitoring site j , state s , averaged over 
year t . 
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/st st stg PME Gov≡ . Thus instead of using stPME as a separate variable, we use total 
government spending normalized by GDP therefore defining /st st stG Gov GDP≡ . 
Consistent with the literature, a 3 year moving average of personal income is used to 
proxy permanent income ( stI ) (Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor, 2001). A vector of 
regulations, R st  is controlled for.   
Formally,  
(7)       1 2 3 4 5 6 R
ST FD ST FD
jst st st st st st st t st js jstz g g G G Iγ γ γ γ γ γ τ ν μ ε= + + + + + + + + +  
 
 Where STstg , and 
FD
stg  are the shares of PME spending over total government spending 
for State and local governments, and Federal direct and indirect expenditures (loans and 
insurance) respectively. Accordingly, STstG  and 
FD
stG  is the share of total government 
spending over GDP by the state and federal level of government respectively. tτ  are the 
year effects. stν is the unobserved state-specific effect, which may be fixed or time 
varying, jsμ  is the unobserved site specific effect, which may be fixed or random; and 
jstε  is an idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
with zero mean and fixed variance. 
 
Dependant variable and main variables of interest  
The dependant variable is the log difference of sulfur dioxide concentrations. The main 
variables of interest are share of PME spending over total spending at the state and local 
level and federal level. The normalization of PME spending is convenient as it yields unit 
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free measures of the variables. As indicated earlier, total government spending over GDP 
is included as an explanatory variable, and thus RME spending does not need to be 
explicitly included in the estimation.  Hence the interpretation of a negative and 
significant coefficient for any of the share of PME spending variables implies that a 
reallocation of spending from RME to PME results in a decline in the log difference of 
SO2 concentrations, which is the central hypothesis of this paper. One should also be 
careful about the interpretation of the results with regards to level of government. The 
level of government spending is classified according to delivery, not origination. Thus a 
negative significant effect of the share of PME at the state level of spending implies that a 
reallocation of funds from RME to PME for state level expenditures and federal 




There are three aspects of regulations that have to be considered in the estimations: (i) the 
Acid Rain Program, (ii) the ambient air quality standards specifically the assignment of 
counties to attainment and non-attainment status by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency. A non-attainment status implies that the monitoring sites recorded levels of 
pollutions in violation with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). (iii) 
The degree of stringency of regulations across states that do not vary over time.  
 
This study addresses these aspects in the following ways. (i) The Acid Rain Program 
(Title IV) is accounted for using fixed year effects, since this is a federal policy that 
applies to all states. Title IV is an important piece of legislation that has been shown to 
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have affected sulfur dioxide emissions.  For ambient air quality standards (ii), two 
variables are use. The first is a dummy that has a value of 1 if a whole county was under 
non-attainment status in the previous year. The second is also a dummy equal to one if a 
county was partially under nonattainment status in the previous year. Previous studies 
have found the NAAQS to have a significant negative but modest effect on sulfur dioxide 
concentrations (Greenstone, 2004).  To capture state specific regulations that do not vary 
over time (iii), site fixed effects are used. Furthermore, the number of electricity 
generating power plants has hardly changed over time, and therefore this is also captured 




 There are three pertinent econometric issues to be considered: reverse causality, omitted 
variable bias, and pollution migration across states also known as trans-boundary air 
pollution. Constrained by the availability of data, I show below how I do my best to limit 
each of the econometric issues stated above. 
 
Reverse Causality 
If sulfur dioxide concentrations are a determinant of PME spending, this would imply 
that PME spending is correlated with the stochastic error term, jstε , thus biasing the 
estimates. However, since the share of PME spending is an aggregate of several spending 
programs it is unlikely that broad spending policies will be determined solely by 
environmental concerns. Therefore, it is less likely that reverse causality is an issue. Even 
25 
 
if fiscal spending is a forward looking variable, that is PME spending shares are 
determined by expected future sulfur dioxide concentrations, the correlation between 
PME spending and sulfur dioxide concentrations would be positive, and thus any 
negative effects of the share of PME spending on sulfur dioxide concentrations would be 
even stronger if reverse causality was accounted for.  
 
Omitted Variable Bias 
 
Omitted variable bias is an important issue in the specification of equation (7). If a 
relevant variable is omitted, it will be absorbed in the error term, which leads to biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Using panel estimation models such as fixed site effects will 
account for time invariant omitted variables. The challenging issue is time varying 
omitted variables. If a time varying omitted variable, such as regulation enforcement is 
positive correlated with the share of PME spending, but negatively correlated with Sulfur 
Dioxide air concentrations, then the coefficient of the share of PME spending will be 
biased upwards (more negative). I use the following procedures to limit the effect of 
omitted variables. I use the Altonji (2005) methodology, which I call the Added Controls 
Approach, where I control for several other variables and see whether the coefficients of 
interest change. I also use a new Time Varying State Effects (TVS) approach to capture 
state-level omitted variables that are correlated or show patterns over time (López and 
Palacios, 2011; López and Islam, 2011). This approach is a generalization of state fixed 
effects and deals with omitted variables in a rigorous and systematic way. The details of 








Monitoring sites near the border of states may pick up SO2 concentrations originating 
from neighboring states. Similarly monitoring sites in a state may read low levels of SO2 
concentrations as they are blown away to other states. This invites the possibility of 
spurious correlation. I account for this in three ways. First, a study by Fioletov et al. 
(2011) finds that the mean SO2 values near the emissions sources became insignificant in 
the atmosphere beyond a distance 75 km from the source, even for the largest single SO2 
emitting source in their sample. As indicated in figure 11, after 75km, the SO2 values for 
both the largest emission source (Bowen power plant in Georgia) and 20th largest 
emission source (Belews Creek power plant in North Carolina) are close to zero. As 
shown in figure 5, most coal plants are located in the Northeast of Southern parts of the 
US. Thus I remove all monitoring sites that are 75 km or less from the state boundary in 
the Northeast and Southern states and check if the results are robust. It is important to 
note that while acid rain does travel far distances, none of the SO2 monitors would pick 
up the presence of acid disposition because its chemical composition is different from 
SO2 concentrations (Fioletov et al., 2011). Consequently, the issue at hand is the distance 
at which emissions become insignificant in the atmosphere not the distance of acid rain 
disposition from the source of SO2 emissions.  
 
Second, I use the fixed effects regression model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
that account for cross-sectional dependence in panel data. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
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present a consistent covariance matrix for continuous dependent variable models with 
spatially dependent panel data by creating a panel data variation of the Newey and West 
estimators (Newey and West, 1987).  This is widely used in the literature (Fleisher et al., 
2010; Bun and Klassen, 2007).  
 
Third, at the state level, I estimate spatial lag and a spatial error model using the inverse 
distance of the locations of the center of the highest concentration of monitoring sites 
across states. Thus the further away monitoring sites are located from each other, the less 




Annual site level sulfur dioxide concentrations are obtained from the US Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA). The data is an unbalanced panel available from 1985 to 2008 
across 50 States and Washington DC. There are about 1668 monitoring stations, and a 
total of 15,233 observations. Only data that was collected using a consistent methodology 
at the monitoring site is used. All the concentrations data used are readings taken from 
monitoring sites which are the maximum daily reading averaged for the full length of 
period in the sample. The EPA uses the maximum daily reading to set sulfur dioxide air 
quality standards as short exposure to sulfur dioxide concentrations has harmful health 
effects. Most empirical studies examining the determinants of pollutants in the US use 
concentrations data because emissions data is highly interpolated with emissions 
28 
 
inventories only taken once every 3 to 5 years (Auffhammer et al., 2011, Auffhammer et 
al., 2009;  Greenstone, 2004; Henderson, 1996).   
 
Government spending data is obtained from the Spending Allocation Database by State 
(SADS) constructed by Islam (2011). This database is created by combining three 
different datasets, all maintained by the US Census Bureau. Each dataset provides 
spending data by state and differs by the level of government and spending category 
aggregation. The state and local level data set, known as State Government Finances, is 
aggregated under broadly defined categories with coverage existing from 1983 to 2008. 
The allocation of broad categories into PME and RME state and local spending is 
presented in Table A4.  
 
For federal spending, the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) provides 
disaggregation by specific program, and thus a more precise division of PME and RME 
spending is possible. Over 1,500 programs are identified by department, and categorized 
as to whether they fall under two types of PME spending - social goods, non-social public 
good, or under RME spending (private subsidies). Difficult to categorize spending 
programs are left under “other.” Typically, a program description is provided in the data, 
or can be obtained by tracking the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) 
number for each program through other sources. Furthermore, each type of spending is a 
combination of two groups – direct spending and assistance spending. Direct spending 
includes grants, salaries and wages, procurement contracts, and other direct payments. 
Direct assistance includes direct loans, guaranteed/insured loans and insurance (see Table 
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A6). Assistance spending may also involve obligations. Typically de-obligations are 
indicated as negative amounts in CFFR. It is difficult to track, by program, when 
obligations were made, and how to distribute the negative amounts in prior years. Thus, 
negative figures are retained, and are included in the aggregate estimation of the spending 
type. The general categorization of each spending category by department is presented in 
Table A5.  
 
Administrative expenditures appear separately in the CFFR and have to be distributed. In 
some cases, all the programs in a department can be identified under one category of 
spending. When a whole department does not fall under one category of spending, the 
administrative expenditures are divided by the ratio of each type of spending over total 
department spending. The assumption is that administrative spending is proportional to 
the amount of spending per type in the department. In the case of pre-1993 data, the 
administrative spending is not allocated by department. Thus the administrative spending 
is first divided by the department by the proportion of department spending over total 
spending. This is then further divided into the type of spending, using the proportion of 
the type of spending over total department spending.  
 
Finally, there is a major potential issue of double counting – some of the CFFR 
expenditures are directed at states. Since CFFR does not indicate what types of spending 
are directed at states, a third database - Federal Aid to States (FAS) is used to limit 
double counting. FAS data contains amounts and details of federal grants to states, under 
broader categorization than the CFFR. Thus data in the FAS are split into PME and RME 
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spending, and then subtracted from grants from the CFFR to come up with a total of 
federal spending net of any grants to state and local governments. All federal datasets 
have time coverage of 1985-2008.  
 
To summarize, government spending data are available at the state and local level, 
federal direct spending net grants to states, and federal assistance (indirect) spending. 
Summary statistics of government spending variables and other controls are available in 
Table A2. Data description, sources and time coverage are presented in Table A3.  
 




Table 1 presents the OLS, fixed, and random site effects estimates in columns 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. The Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance is used to estimate the 
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. All estimates yield negative coefficients 
for the share of PME spending at the state and local level of government, significant at 
1%. The coefficients for the share of PME spending at the state level range between -0.25 
to -0.475. The share of PME spending at the federal level of government is insignificant. 
Total government spending is not robust across the estimates for either state or federal 
levels of government.  
 
                                                     
5 Some of the effects of PME spending may take a large period of time to have an effect. The estimates in 
Table 1 were repeated using 3 year moving averages of the spending variable. The results in Table 1 were 
largely retained.  
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The coefficient for personal income is consistent with the literature, yielding a negative 
coefficient significant at 1% across all estimation models. This implies a strong income 
effect with regards to sulfur dioxide air concentrations. Both non-attainment status 
variables for sulfur dioxide are negative, but only the counties which partially had non-
attainment status in the previous year resulted in a statistically significant reduction in 
SO2, with a level of significant of 1%. This implication maybe that counties that were 
partially under non-attainment status in the previous year may have enforced stricter 
sulfur dioxide regulations in order to remove the non-attainment status.    
 
As discussed earlier. The share of PME spending is unlikely to be affected by reverse 
causality. However, the issue of omitted variable bias persists. As stated earlier, fixed site 
effects addresses the issue of time-invariant omitted variables, however I still have the 
issue of time varying omitted variables. To address this, I use two approaches as part of 
the sensitivity analysis – the added controls approach, and the TVC approach. 
 
Added Controls Approach  
 
Studies have shown that several factors may directly or indirectly affect environmental 
quality. Factors such as economic intensity (Antweiler et al., 2001; Grossman and 
Kruger, 1995; Harbaugh et al., 2002), sector composition (Brooks and Sethi, 1997;  
Antweiler et al, 2001), socioeconomic characteristics such as racial composition and 
economic conditions (Brooks and Sethi, 1997; Khanna, 2002) have all been determinants 
of environmental quality. In addition, pollution abatement costs may influence firms’ 
decisions to pollute and this may influence environmental quality (Levinson , 1996;  
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Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Since electric utilities contribute about two thirds of sulfur 
dioxide emissions, total net generation of electricity may be an important control variable 
for the specification in equation (7). Price of natural gas or fuel may influence activities 
that emit SO2. Several meteorological factors may also affect air quality such as wind 
speed and direction, temperature, height of monitoring site probe, and elevation above 
sea level. Finally, pollution readings in a state can be correlated by the no. of monitoring 
sites in the state. I add a set of variables representing each of the determinants listed 
above in sequence into the random and fixed site effect estimations in Table 1 to test the 
robustness of the variables of interest. Some of these controls are interpolated due to 
sparse data. Pollution abatement costs data is linearly imputed for the years 1987, 1995-
1998, 2000-2004, and racial composition data from the census is linearly imputed for the 
years 1981-1989, 1991-1999. The meteorological data is obtained from a few sites that 
have the data, and assumed to be representative of the whole state. 
 
Table 2 shows the coefficients of the effect of PME spending for state and local 
governments as each set of controls are added. An increase in the adjusted R-squared 
relative to the base estimations implies that including the additional sets of controls raises 
the explanatory power of the model. If the coefficient of PME spending retains the sign 
and significance, this implies that the coefficient is stable and robust to the additional 
regressors.  
 
Table 2 shows that the coefficients of PME spending are largely unaffected by the 
additional sets of control variables. Both the sign and significance of the PME spending 
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coefficient is negative and has a significant of at least 5%. Racial composition proxies, 
and meteorological conditions all raise the adjusted R squared of the random site effects 
model, while there is no improvement in the adjusted R squared for the fixed site effects 
model. Considering the potential controls presented in Table 2, I can conclude that the 
results are robust to omitted variables that are correlated with these sets of variables. 
However, there may be factors that I cannot proxy or are ignorant about, and thus the 
issue omitted variables is not completely accounted for. I use the Time Varying State 
Effects (TVS) approach, as described in the next section, to mitigate the biases of 
difficult to measure determinants of air pollution. 
 
Time Varying State Effects (TVS) 
 
The estimations in Table 1 are subject to omitted variable bias due to the state level 
factors that may be omitted because they are difficult to measure or our ignorance about 
other potential determinants of sulfur dioxide concentrations. Thus, I introduce time-
varying state-specific effects (TVS). This methodology has been previously used by 
López  and Palacios (2011) and López  and Islam (2011).  
 
Reconsider equation (7) where stν is the unobserved state-specific effect, which may be 
fixed or time varying. This stν  effect in (7) corresponds to the TVS, which is a state 
specific function of time that captures the effects of certain state level omitted variables 
on the pollutant. Potential important control variables, for example state macroeconomic 
policies, regulatory and political institutions and so forth, follow certain patterns that tend 
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to change over time. This may be non-linear, but not always monotonically, and 
potentially in a state-specific manner. The evolution of such policies and institutions may 
display some correlation with time. Thus such omitted control variables may be 
adequately captured by polynomial functions of time. I approximate the stν  effect by a 
(T-2)th order (state specific) polynomial function of time, where the parameters are 
allowed to take different values for each state as shown below:  
(8)  2 3 20 1 2 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ........ ( )
T
st s s s s T s stb b trnd b trnd b trnd b trnd eν
−
−= + + + + + +  
Where 0sb , 1 2 3, ,s s sb b b ,….. 2,T sb − are coefficients that are allowed to be different for each 
state and trnd  is a time trend variable. The coefficients 0sb correspond to the fixed state 
effects and the remaining coefficients capture the state specific time-varying effects. 
 
Substituting (8) into (7) I obtain the estimating equation with new disturbance 
term jst jst steε ε= + . I assume the polynomial in equation (8) is an exact approximation 
of stν , and thus the residual of the polynomial approximation, ste , is assumed to be 
random and independent of time, an assumption that is empirically tested. One could 
fully control for all the stv effects by using the complete matrix of state-year dummies but 
of course this would leave no degrees of freedom to estimate the effect of any other 
variable. However, if I assume that the unobserved effects are not completely time 
independent, a (T-2)th polynomial may be sufficiently flexible to capture the unobserved 




The TVS is a generalization of the standard fixed state effects model as the fixed state 
effects correspond to the 0ib coefficients in (8). Thus the standard state fixed effects can 
be regarded as a special case where (8) is restricted by imposing that all coefficients other 
than the constants be zero. Thus I can also I can test the validity of the state fixed effects 
model parametrically by imposing the following restrictions: 1 2 2.... 0s s T sb b b −= = = = for 
all }{1,2,...,s S∈ while 0 0sb ≠ , for all or some s . 
 
The TVS estimation model is related to estimations present in the literature (Cornwell et 
al., 1990; Jacobsen et al., 1993; Friedberg, 1998; and Wolfers, 2006). These studies 
choose up to a quadratic function of time in order to capture individual or state-specific 
slow moving omitted variables, not really justifying why a quadratic function is adequate 
for the estimation. The main advantage of the TVS model proposed here over similar 
estimations in the literature is that the data defines the limit of the time trend polynomial 
consistent with the degrees of freedom in the data.6  
 
Table 3 presents the TVS-RSE model where I include both random site level effects and 
time varying state level effects. Since the lowest number of observations per state is 6, 
only up to the 4th polynomial is necessary to approximate stv
7. However, just to check for 
consistency, I provide estimates up to the 5th polynomial. The estimation with only a 
                                                     
6 A related estimation method is the interactive effects (Bai, 2009; Kneip, Sickles, and Song, 2012). If the 
state specific unobserved heterogeneity in the data can indeed be explained by the TVS effects, then the 
TVS estimation model is more efficient than the interactive effects (Kim and Oka, 2012).  
7 The low number of observations for some states is due to the fact that only monitoring sites with a 
consistent methodology in terms of length of time of the exposure are included in the study 
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linear approximation of stv is shown in column 1, while column 2 shows the squared 
approximation, and so on until up to the 5th polynomial approximation in column 5.  
 
Using the 4th polynomial approximation of stv , the share of PME spending at the state and 
local level retains the sign and significance at 5% while federal PME spending remains 
insignificant. The size of the coefficient of the former is larger than OLS, random, and 
fixed site effects reported in table. The sign and significance of personal income is 
retained at 1%, while total government spending is positive and non-significant for both 
state and federal levels of government. The attainment status variable for partial counties 
retains the negative sign and a significance of 5%.  
The TVS-RSE residuals as indicated in Table 3 are time independent8. The log likelihood 
ratio test favors the TVS-RSE model over using state level fixed effects at the 1% level of 
significance. I also estimated the TVS-FSE model as indicated in Table A11. Although 
the results are qualitatively similar to the TVS-RSE model, the residuals are generally not 
time independent.  
Magnitude of Effects 
 
The elasticities of PME spending for state and local governments with respect to sulfur 
dioxide concentrations are presented in Table 4. Using the fixed and random effects 
estimates in Table 1 and the TVS-RE estimates in Table 3, a 10 % increase in the share of 
                                                     
8 The p-values presented at the bottom of table 3 test the time independence of the residual using the 
estimation constantjst trendε β= +  
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PME spending reduces sulfur dioxide concentrations by 4%, 3%, and 5% respectively for 
state and local governments.  The magnitude of all the effects has a significance of at 
least 1% apart from the TVS-RSE estimates which have a significance of 5%. This is a 
significant effect since sulfur dioxide concentrations have been falling at an annual 
average rate of 5% from 1980 to 2008. The results are consistent with the findings of 
Lopez, Galinato and Islam (2011) who find that the share of PME spending has a 
negative effect on air and water pollution. 
 
Robustness Checks: Extreme Observation Dominance 
 
A small number of outlier observations may be driving the results. In order to address 
this, I drop the top 1%, the bottom 1%, and both top 1% and bottom 1% observations of 
the dependent variable (log difference of sulfur dioxide concentrations) and the variable 
of interest (PME spending for the state and local government) and re-estimate the fixed 
and random state effects estimations in Table 1 and the TVS-RSE estimations in Table 2. 
The results are presented in Table A7, A8 and A9 for fixed site effects, random site 
effects, and TVS-RSE respectively. The signs of the coefficients for PME spending for 
the state and local levels of government are negative and have at least a 10% level of 
significance for all the sample alterations for random site effects and fixed site effects. 
This is also true for TVS-RSE estimates. Thus extreme or outlier observations do not 





Robustness Check: State Dominance 
 
I also consider the possibility that the results may be driven by a particular state. Thus, I 
drop each state, one at a go, and re-estimate the fixed and random site effects models in 
Table 1. Figures 2 and 3 present the coefficients of PME spending at the state and local 
level for the fixed and random site level estimation models and the 95% confidence 
interval. As indicated in the graphs, the sign and significance of PME spending at the 
state and local level is robust and not dominated by any one particular state in the sample.  
 
Robustness Check: Specification 
 
As a further robustness check, I estimated a dynamic panel model using the Arellano-
Bond two-step procedure “System” Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The GMM 
estimation accounts for inertia that may exist in the determination of sulfur dioxide 
concentrations and also uses predetermined values as instruments in a systematic way. 
The estimates are presented in Table A10. The first column uses un-collapsed 
instruments, and the second column presents collapsed instruments. The seventh lag of 
endogenous variables used as instruments.  The sign and significance of the coefficients 
of PME spending at the state and local level of government is retained. The lagged 
dependent variable is insignificant implying that there are no significant dynamic effects. 
The Hansen test indicates that the instruments are exogenous and there is also no second 
order autocorrelation.  
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Robustness Check: Pollution Migration 
 
The estimates in Table 1 are repeated in table A12 with all sites a distance of 75 km or 
below from the state border omitted for the northeast and southern regions of the US. 
Thus the monitoring site count drops from 1668 to 1109. However, as shown in table 
A12, the sign of the share of PME for the state and local levels of government is retained 
with at least a 10% significance level, indicating that pollution migration may not be a 
significant factor. A further comparison between Table 1 and A12 reveals that excluding 
sites closer to the state border results in estimates of higher magnitude for State and local 
PME spending for all estimation models. It is difficult know whether to attribute these 
changes in magnitude and significance to air pollution migration or the decline in the 
number of observations. Table A13 uses the Driscoll-Kraay estimator for fixed effects 
and the results for the PME spending variables are retained assuming autocorrelation up 
to 6 levels of lags. The results for sate and local PME spending retain sign and 
significance Thus the results in this study may be robust to the possibility of cross-
sectional spatial dependence.  
 
Finally, using the average GPS coordinates of each monitoring site over the whole state, a 
spatial lag and spatial error model is estimated using an inverse distance weighting 
matrix. The results are presented in Table A14 and show that the share of PME spending 
for the state and local level retain significance of about 5%. Both the spatial lag and 
spatial autocorrelation terms are insignificant. This may imply that spatial aspect of sulfur 




Robustness Check: Structural Change across Regions 
 
Given that very few coal-fired electric utilities are located in the West and Midwest 
regions of the US, there is a possibility that the share of PME spending at the state and 
local level may have no impact in these regions. Using the chow test to test for structural 
change for these regions (see p-values in Table A15) we find that there is no difference in 
the effect of the share of PME spending by state and local governments in the Western 
region from the base estimations. However at the 10% level of significance, we reject that 
the Midwest region has parameter estimates equal to the base regressions. Re-estimations 
of the RE and FE models for the Midwest region alone retains the sign and significance 
of the share of PME spending for  state and local governments.  
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the effect of the composition of government spending at various 
levels of government on the sulfur dioxide air pollution in the US. A reallocation of 
government spending from private subsidies (RME) to social spending that alleviates 
market failures and increases public goods (PME), holding total government spending 
fixed, results in significant reductions in the log difference of sulfur dioxide 
concentrations for state and local governments but not the federal government. After 
subjecting the results to rigorous tests that limit the affect of omitted variable bias and 
also sensitivity to sample alterations, I find that the effect state and local PME spending is 
robust. The results are consistent with the findings of Lopez, Galinato and Islam (2011) 
who find a negative effect of a reallocation from RME to PME spending on air and water 
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pollutants. Also, similar to the literature, the effect of personal income on the log 
difference of sulfur dioxide concentrations is robust. 
 
In the light of the present economic circumstances, this study is a timely addition to the 
debate on US government spending priorities. While the effect of total government 
spending is neutral, the reductions of sulfur dioxide air pollution by increasing the share 
PME spending may imply that reductions in US state government spending under huge 
budget deficits should be taken with care. Even though the main goal of fiscal policy is 
not to alleviate environmental concerns, it is important to consider the effects they may 
have on the environment, potentially affecting the impact of existing and potentially 
costly environmental regulations. 
 
There are a few limitations of this study that can be addressed by future research. A study 
of the effect of tax expenditures, or expenditures via tax breaks, on pollutants may 
complement this study that focuses on revenue expenditures. Furthermore, the issue of 





Tables And Figures 
 
Table 1: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending 
 




Share of PME over Total Spending – State 








[0.079] [0.154] [0.127] 
Share of PME over Total Spending –Federal 
Grants, Expenditure, Loans and Insurance 
 
0.027 -0.022 0.004 
[0.038] [0.077] [0.064] 
Total State and Local Government Spending 
over GDP  
 
-0.175 -0.394 -0.361 
[0.132] [0.296] [0.242] 
Total Federal Government Spending over 
GDP ) 
 
-0.02 -0.187** -0.061 
[0.034] [0.093] [0.068] 
Personal Income per Capita by County – log 
difference of 3 year moving average (in 
thousands) 
-0.390*** -0.449*** -0.433*** 
[0.125] [0.144] [0.131] 
Non-attainment Status for the whole county 
for the Previous Year (SO2 NAAQs) 
 
-0.028 -0.006 -0.024 
[0.022] [0.028] [0.029] 
Non-attainment Status for part of county for 
the Previous Year (SO2 NAAQs) 
 
-0.028*** -0.023* -0.032** 
[0.009] [0.013] [0.016] 
Latitude of site 
 
 
0.0003  -0.0002 
[0.001]  [0.002] 
Longitude of site 
 
0.001**  0.001** 
[0.000]  [0.001] 
 
Site characteristics and land use dummies Yes No Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 2R  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Number of Observations 15233 15233 15233 
Number of sites 1668 1668 1668 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Robust standard errors used,  Site 
characteristics include Rural, Suburban, Urban and City Center. Land Use dummies include Agricultural. 




Table 2: Added Controls Approach 
Fixed Site Effects (FSE) Random Site Effects (RSE) 
 Coefficient of Share of PME 




Coefficient of Share of 
PME by State and Local 
Governments 















GDP per Land (sq 






























































Fuel Prices (log 
difference) 







[0.154]  [0.127]  
Monitoring Sites 











[0.155]  [0.128]  
Wind Speed and 
Direction 
















Elevation Above Sea 
Level, Height of 























* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Robust standard errors used  
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Table 3: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending Variable State - Random Site Effects – 
TVS-RSE 
 
Share of PME over 
Total Spending –State 













[0.197] [0.219] [0.242] [0.248] [0.251] 






-0.092 -0.097 -0.155 -0.065 -0.337** 
[0.107] [0.136] [0.140] [0.154] [0.156] 
Total State and Local 
Government Spending 
over GDP  
 
 
-0.572 -0.502 -0.691 -0.685 -0.208 
[0.356] [0.403] [0.439] [0.461] [0.508] 
Total Federal 
Government Spending 
over GDP  
 
 
-0.077 -0.113 -0.097 -0.16 0.114 
[0.187] [0.202] [0.217] [0.240] [0.257] 
Personal Income per 
Capita by County – 
log difference of 3 
year moving average 
(in thousands) 
 
-0.459*** -0.465*** -0.480*** -0.467*** -0.464*** 
[0.133] [0.135] [0.138] [0.140] [0.141] 
Non-attainment Status 
for the whole county 
for the Previous Year 
(SO2 NAAQs) 
 
-0.022 -0.018 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] 
Non-attainment Status 
for part of county for 




-0.035** -0.033** -0.036** -0.033** -0.035** 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
State Dummy x (Time 
Trend) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




No Yes Yes Yes Yes 




No No Yes Yes Yes 




No No No Yes Yes 




No No No No Yes 
Site characteristics and 
land use dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 
2R  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Number of 
Observations 15233 15233 15233 15233 15233 
Number of sites 1668 1668 1668 1668 1668 
Specification Tests      
Test for the time 0.9970 0.9751 0.9861 0.9801 0.9836 
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independence of the 
residuals: p-values 
Correlation coefficient 
between the residuals 
and time trend  
0.000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
Test for fixed site 
effect model 
Ho: 
1 2 3 0,i i ib b b= = =
 
Log Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
110*** 183*** 250*** 353*** 429*** 
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%, Robust 




Table 4: Magnitude of Effects 
 
Elasticity of SO2 concentrations with respect to the Share of PME over Total 
Spending by State and Local Governments  
(evaluated at the sample means) 
 
Fixed Site Effects Random Site Effects Variable State Random Site 
Effects (TVS-RE) 
 
1% increase in PME 
spending 
-0.39%*** -0.30%*** -0.49%** 
   
   





Table A1: Sources of SO2 Emissions 
 
 











Min Max Unit 
Sulfur Dioxide 
19.37 16.01 0.00932 222.9 Parts Per Billion 
(PBM) 
Share of PME over Total 
Spending –State and  Local 
Governments  
0.820 0.042 0.582 0.933 
 
Fraction over total 
state expenditures 
 
Share of PME over Total 
Spending – Direct and Indirect 
Federal Expenditures  
 
0.788 0.098 0.185 0.945 
Fraction over total 
federal grants not via 
states 
Total State and Local 
Government Spending over 
GDP 
0.176 0.030 0.084 0.300 
Fraction over total 
Federal Loans and 
Insurance 
Total Federal Government 
Spending over GDP  
 
0.245 0.106 0.140 0.846 
 
Fraction Over GDP  
County Personal Income per 
Capita by (in thousands) 
 
23,674 9.419 6,665 118,768  
Per capita, USD 
Latitude 38.902 4.840 19.204 60.695 Degrees 
Longitude -89.576 15.045 -158.133 -67.401 Degrees 
GDP per Land (sq km) 8,362,759 40,800,000 33,536 1,580,000,000 Per Square km 
(land) 
GDP growth 0.057 0.040 -0.310 1.290 Log difference of 
GDP 
 
Population Density 233 485 0.951 10,391 Per Square km 
(land) 
 
Share of Manufacturing over 
GDP 
0.177 0.072 0.002 0.333 
Proportion 
Employment in Manufacturing 615,703 498,052 2,017 2,222,373 Number employed 
Unemployment Rate 5.617 1.561 2.240 13.430 Percentage 
Poverty Rate 12.902 3.316 2.900 27.200 Percentage 
Pollution Abatement Capital 
Expenditures  
190.360 224.952 0.000 1699.00  Millions of dollars 
Pollution Abatement Operating 
Costs  
547.648 468.320 4.900 2622.80 Millions of dollars 
Proportion white 0.833 0.092 0.258 0.986 Proportion 
Proportion black 0.108 0.074 0.003 0.658 Proportion 
Average Wind Speed 5.117 1.474 0.336 24.483 Knots 
Average Wind Direction 191.223 14.508 47.243 225.988 Degrees 
Temperature 55.33 10.733 25.641 133.377 Fahrenheit 
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Elevation Above Sea Level 252.788 364.268 0 5040 Meters 
Site Prove Height 5.130 4.288 1 152 Meters 
Price of Natural Gas 5.646 2.272 1.243 27.540 Dollars per million 
Btu 
Price of Diesel 10.059 4.647 5.743 29.505 Dollars per million 
Btu 
















































Definition Years Available Data Source 
Sulfur Dioxide 
 
Sulfur Dioxide concentrations by 
monitoring site (Daily Hourly 
Maximum) 
 
1980-2009 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Share of PME over Total 
Spending –State and  Local 
Governments  
US government spending on  
PME by states. Any federal spending to 




US Census Bureau, State 
Government Finances 
Share of PME over Total 
Spending – Direct and Indirect 
Federal Expenditures  
US government spending on PME 
directly through federal grants and 
expenditures and federal loans and 
insurance. This excludes any federal 
grants to states. 
 
1983-2008 
US Census Bureau, 
Consolidated Federal Funds 




Total State and Local 
Government Spending over 
GDP 
Total  State and Local government 
spending over GDP 1983-2008 
US Census Bureau, 





Total Federal Government 
Spending over GDP  
 
Total Federal spending, including loans 
and insurance over GDP 1983-2008 
US Census Bureau Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report (CFFR), 
Federal Aid to States (FAS) 
 
Personal Income per Capita by 
County – log difference of 3 
year moving average (in 
thousands) 
 
 1980-2008 US Census Bureau 
 
Non-attainment Status for the 
whole county for the Previous 
Year (SO2 NAAQs) 
 
Dummy is 1 if the whole county was 
under non-attainment status in the 
previous year 
1978-2011 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 
Non-attainment Status for part of 
county for the Previous Year 
(SO2 NAAQs) 
 
Dummy is 1 if the part of the county 
was under non-attainment status in the 
previous year 
1978-2011 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Latitude 
 1980-2009 




US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
GDP per Land (sq km) 
 1980-2009 








US Census Bureau, State 
Government Finances 
Share of Manufacturing over 
GDP  1980-2008 




Employment in Manufacturing 
 1980-2008 




Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Poverty Rate 
 1980-2009 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Survey, 
Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements 
Pollution Abatement Capital 
Expenditures  
Expenditures by manufacturing 
establishments collected via surveys. 





US Department of Commerce, 
EPA 
Pollution Abatement Operating 
Costs 
Expenditures by manufacturing 
establishments collected via surveys. 





US Department of Commerce, 
EPA 
Proportion white 




Population Division, US Census 
Bureau 
Proportion black 




Population Division, US Census 
Bureau 
Average Wind Speed Wind speed averaged over sites with 
wind speed readings by state 
 
1980-2009 US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Average Wind Direction Wind direction averaged over sites with 
wind direction readings by state 
 
1980-2009 US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Temperature Temperature averaged over sites with 
temperature readings by state 
 
1980-2009 US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Elevation Above Sea Level The elevation (in meters) above the 
Mean Sea Level (MSL) of the site 
 
1980-2009 US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Site Prove Height Height of Monitoring Site Probe 1980-2009 US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 
Price of Natural Gas Natural gas average price, all sectors 
(including supplemental gaseous fuels). 




U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Price of Diesel Distillate fuel oil price in the 
transportation sector (diesel). Dollars 
per million Btu 
 
1980-2009 U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Total Net Generation of 
Electricity 
 
Total Net generation of electricity by 
state in billions of megawatt hours 
1990-2010 US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 










Table A4: State and Local Spending Type Classification 
Department Spending Classification 
Education 
Health: (Includes Environmental Protection) 
Social Security and Welfare: 
Housing and Community Development: 
 
 
Social Goods (PME) 
  
Public Order and Safety 
Transportation and Sanitation 







Private Subsidies (RME) 
  
Un-allocable Government Expenditures 
Government Administration 
Insurance Trusts 







Table A5: Federal Spending Type Classification 
Department Spending Classification 
Social Security Administration  
 
Social Goods (PME) 
Health and Human Services 
Education 
Housing and Urban Development 
National Science Foundation 
Office of Personnel Management 
  
Corps of Engineers  
 
 
Public Goods – Non social (PME) 
Judicial Branch 
Legislative Branch 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Justice 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Homeland Security 
  
Executive Office of the President  
Other Defense-Military 
Veteran Affairs 












Small Business Administration 
Transportation 
Treasury 
State and Other International Programs 
Other Independent Agencies 
  
 
Table A6: Federal Direct Spending and Assistance Classification 
Direct Spending Assistance 
Grants (Block,  Formula,  Project, and Cooperative 
Agreements) 
Salaries and Wages 
Procurement Contracts 
Retirement and Disability Payments for Individuals 
Other Direct Payments for Individuals 















Table A7: Robustness Check – Extreme Observation Dominance 
Fixed Site Effects 
Dominance Test 








Observations Dropped of  Log 









Observations Dropped of  Share 









   
        Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Robust standard errors used 
 
Table A8: Robustness Check – Extreme Observation Dominance 
Random Site Effects 
Dominance Test 




Bottom 1% Dropped Top 1% Dropped Top 1% & Bottom 
5% Dropped 
 









Observations Dropped of  Share 









   
        Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Robust standard errors used 
 
 
Table A9: Robustness Check – Extreme Observation Dominance Variable State - Random 
Site Effects (TVS-RSE) 
Dominance Test Share of PME goods over Total Spending by State and Local Governments  
 
Bottom 1% Dropped Top 1% Dropped Top 1% & Bottom 5% 
Dropped 
 









Observations Dropped of  Share 









   






Table A10: System GMM Estimator 
 GMM – Un-collapsed 
Instruments 
GMM – Collapsed 
Instruments 
 
Share of PME over Total Spending – State 







Share of PME over Total Spending –





Total State and Local Government 









Personal Income per Capita by County – 




Non-attainment Status for the whole county 




Non-attainment Status for part of county 



















Site characteristics and land use dummies Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Hansen Test (P- value) 0.231 0.963 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.051 0.658 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.973 0.466 
Number of Observations 14360 14360 
Number of sites 1514 1514 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Two-step covariance matrix derived by 





Table A11: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending  
Variable State - Fixed Site Effects – TVS-FSE 
 
Share of PME over Total 













[0.190] [0.203] [0.228] [0.241] [0.255] 
Share of PME over Total 
Spending –Federal Grants, 
Expenditure, Loans and 
Insurance 
 
-0.11 -0.14 -0.18 -0.101 -0.336** 
[0.101] [0.126] [0.133] [0.143] [0.160] 
Total State and Local 
Government Spending over 
GDP  
 
-0.445 -0.456 -0.61 -0.651 -0.157 
[0.347] [0.386] [0.443] [0.476] [0.510] 
Total Federal Government 
Spending over GDP  
 
-0.177 -0.189 -0.147 -0.178 0.126 
[0.200] [0.216] [0.228] [0.285] [0.297] 
Personal Income per Capita by 
County – log difference of 3 
year moving average (in 
thousands) 
 
-0.459*** -0.459*** -0.452*** -0.435*** -
0.436**
* 
[0.145] [0.149] [0.152] [0.156] [0.158] 
Non-attainment Status for the 
whole county for the Previous 
Year (SO2 NAAQs) 
 
-0.012 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
[0.035] [0.037] [0.036] [0.038] [0.039] 
Non-attainment Status for part 
of county for the Previous 
Year (SO2 NAAQs) 
 
-0.029** -0.021 -0.025* -0.021 -0.026* 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] 
State Dummy x (Time Trend) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




No Yes Yes Yes Yes 




No No Yes Yes Yes 




No No No Yes Yes 




No No No No Yes 
Site characteristics and land 
use dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 
2R  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Number of Observations 15233 15233 15233 15233 15233 
Number of sites 1668 1668 1668 1668 1668 
Specification Tests      
Test for the time independence 
of the residuals: p-values 0.5285 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
Correlation coefficient 
between the residuals and time 
trend  
0.0051 -0.0421 -0.0295 0.0384 0.0460 
Test for fixed site effect model 
Ho: 
1 2 3 0,i i i for ab b b= = =
 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test 
83*** 168*** 234*** 332*** 417*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Robust standard errors used 
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Table A12: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending  
Sites 75 KM Away From State Border for North East & Southern Regions Removed 
 





Share of PME over Total Spending –via 








[0.187] [0.311] [0.272] 
Share of PME over Total Spending –
Federal Grants, Expenditure, Loans and 
Insurance 
 
0.047 0.003 0.011 
[0.054] [0.120] [0.096] 
Total State Government Spending over 
GDP  
 
-0.444* -0.525 -0.627 
[0.228] [0.492] [0.406] 
Total Federal Government Spending 
over GDP  
 
-0.035 -0.248* -0.082 
[0.052] [0.132] [0.093] 
Personal Income per Capita by County – 
log difference of 3 year moving average 
(in thousands) 
 
-0.329* -0.358 -0.356* 
[0.195] [0.228] [0.206] 
Non-attainment Status for the whole 
county for the Previous Year (SO2 
NAAQs) 
 
-0.036 -0.01 -0.034 
[0.026] [0.017] [0.033] 
Latitude of site 
 
 
0.002  0.001 
[0.001]  [0.003] 
Longitude of site 
 
 
0.001  0.001 
[0.000]  [0.001] 
Site characteristics and land use 
dummies 
Yes No Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 2R  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Number of Observations 9853 9853 9853 
Number of sites 1109 1109 1109 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Robust standard errors used,  
Site characteristics include Rural, Suburban, Urban and City Center. Land Use dummies 










Table A13: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending - Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
 Fixed Site Effects 
(FSE) 
Fixed Site Effects 
(FSE) 
 
Share of PME over Total Spending –via 







Share of PME over Total Spending –

















Personal Income per Capita by County – 





Non-attainment Status for the whole 





Non-attainment Status for part of county 




Lags 1 6 
Site characteristics and land use dummies No No 
Number of Observations 15263 15263 
Number of sites 1674 1674 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors standard errors used,  Site characteristics include Rural, Suburban, Urban and City 
Center. Land Use dummies include Agricultural. Commercial, Desert, Forest, Industrial, 











Table A14: Log Difference of SO2 and Fiscal Spending  
Spatial Lag and Error Model (State Level) 
 Spatial Lag Model Spatial Error Model 
 
Share of PME over Total Spending –via 







Share of PME over Total Spending –

















Personal Income per Capita by County – 





Non-attainment Status for the whole 





Non-attainment Status for part of county 










Spatial Autocorrelation  -0.003 
[0.093] 
  
Number of Observations 1142 1142 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors standard errors used,  Site characteristics include Rural, Suburban, Urban and City 
Center. Land Use dummies include Agricultural. Commercial, Desert, Forest, Industrial, 










Table A15: Test For Structural Change Across Regions 
 Test for Share of PME at the State and Local Lever* 
P-values FE RE 
West 0.4955 0.8782 
Midwest 0.0315 0.0232 
   
*Null hypothesis: regions have equal parameters for state share of PME and intercept 
 
Table A16: Region Classification 
Midwest Northeast South West 
Iowa Wisconsin Alabama Alaska 
Illinois Connecticut Arkansas Arizona 
Indiana Massachusetts District of Columbia California 
Kansas Maine Delaware Colorado 
Michigan New Hampshire Florida Hawaii 
Minnesota New Jersey Georgia Idaho 
Missouri New York Kentucky Montana 
North Dakota Pennsylvania Louisiana New Mexico 
Nebraska Rhode Island Maryland Nevada 
Ohio Vermont Mississippi Oregon 
South Dakota North Carolina Utah 
Oklahoma Washington 






















Table A17:  Estimates of Output Elasticities of energy in the Literature 
 
Study  Elasticity  Country and years 
 
 




Output Elasticity of Electricity for 
US Industries 
 
1960-1992: 0.01 to 0.13 
Stresing et al (2008) Output Elasticity of Energy for US 
Industries 
1960-1978: 0.663 (+/- 
0.153) 
1960-1993: 0.199(+/- 0.06) 
 
Cebula and Herder 
(2010) 





Industrial Sector Output Elasticities of OECD Countries Including US 
 
Liu (2004) GDP/Income elasticities for 
electricity in industrial sector in  
23 OECD countries including US 
using GMM 
 
1978-1999: 0.300 short run 
 1978-1999: 1.035 long run 
Adeyemi and Hunt 
(2007) 
 
Income Elasticity for industrial 
sector and energy for 15 OECD 
countries including US 
 
1962-2003:0.55-0.78 
Olund (2010) 9 OECD countries including US 1978-2006: 0.80 
 
 
All Sectors Output Elasticities (Whole US Economy) 
 
Khanna (2001)  Output Elasticity of Energy for all 
of US 
1965-1990: 0.30 to 0.35  
 
Kamercshen et al 
(2005) 
Total Income elasticity of 




Kummel et al (2008) Output Elasticity of Energy (Linex 
elasticities) for all of US 
1960-1996: 0.35 (+/- 0.11)  
 
Fillipini and Hunt 
(2011)  
Income Elasticity of whole 
economy with regards to energy in 
















Figure 1: SO2 emission Trends 
 
























Figure 2: Fixed Site Effects – Share of PME State and Local Spending 
 
 










Figure 4: Distance Of SO2 Emissions From Source 
 
Source: Fioletov et al. (2011) 
 
Figure 4 shows the mean column SO2 values for the 2005–2007 period plotted as a function of a distance from the 
location of two large emissions sources: the largest US SO2 source (Bowen power plant in Georgia, estimated at 170 
kT y−1) and the 20thlargest source (Belews Creek power plant in North Carolina, 88 kT y−1). Figure 11 
demonstrates that SO2 values near the emissions sources became insignificant beyond about 50 km, even for the 
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Chapter 2: US Government Spending Allocation 
Database by State (SADS) 
 




The US government spending allocation database (from now on SADS) provides data 
on a set of government spending categories by state and local as well as federal 
governments distributed over states for the years 1983-2008.9 The unique feature of this 
database is that it provides consistent disaggregated government spending data by 
functional categories across states while limiting the overlap of expenditures between 
the different government levels. This is achieved by categorizing and aggregating over 
1,500 federal programs and combining it with data on state and local government 
spending. 
In comparison to existing datasets, there are three specific contributions of the SADS 
database: (i) It provides aggregated federal spending data by functional categories 
distributed over states. Currently available spending datasets essentially include time 
series national aggregates as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 
Office of Budget and Management. Furthermore these aggregated categories are 
typically based on spending by federal agency or department instead of functional 
categories. (ii) Aggregated federal spending categories are separated by direct 
expenditures including grants, salaries and wages, and federal indirect expenditures that 
                                                     
9 The database will be updated and revised as the data sources are updated. A link to the dataset can be 
found here: http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~aislam1/ 
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include loans and insurance.  (iii)  SADS combines a pre-existing state government 
spending database with the federal spending data, developing aggregated categories 
consistent across federal and state government spending and mitigates double counting 
of government expenditures. There is currently no database that has consistent spending 
categories by function across state and federal governments distributed geographically 
over all states. 
There are signification contributions the SADS database can have towards future 
research. For instance the 2008-2009 US financial crisis has indicated that although 
federal governments have risen spending by enacting various stimulus packages, most 
of the impact has been diminished due to corresponding spending cuts by state and 
local governments. Furthermore, there is much debate on the pros and cons of 
undertaking fiscal policy at the state versus federal level of government.  
The key challenges of separately considering federal and state and local government 
spending involve (a) creating spending categories that are consistent, and (b) tackling 
the issue of double counting since part of state and local spending is from the federal 
government. In relation to (a), the more detailed the spending categories, the greater the 
potential for research. However, due to constraints with regards data sources, only a 
certain level of disaggregation is possible in order to maintain consistency. The main 
spending categories include Education, Health, Social Welfare, Housing, Public Order 
and Safety, Parks Libraries Arts and Humanities, Infrastructure and Communication, 
Economic Affairs and Private Subsidies, and Other Spending.  State government 
spending includes environmental spending as part of health expenditures. Thus, in the 
SADs database, environmental spending is available as a separate category at the 
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federal level. In relation to (b), the issue of double counting is alleviated by using a 
third data source in order to identify and exclude federal transfers to state governments. 
There are several key assumptions and procedures used to maintain a degree of 
consistency, and these are explained in detail in this document. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a description of data sources and 
methodology of data collection, section 3 highlights the issues and procedures used to 
address them, section 4 provides spending definitions and coverage, section 5 presents 
the data and examples of how it may be used, and finally section 6 concludes. 
    
2. Sources and Methodology 
 
The SADS database is created by combining three different data sources: The 
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), State and Local Government Finances, 
and the Federal Aid to States (FAS), which is part of the CFFR series. All data sources 
are maintained by the US Census Bureau. A rigorous understanding of the three data 
sources is essential to determine the quality of SADS database. Each data source is 
constrained by differing levels of spending aggregation, and degree of accuracy due to 
changes in the data source over time. The spending aggregation limits the level of 
spending detail the SADS database can attain, and the changes in the underlying data 
sources over time have to be accounted for in order to have a consistent database. This 
section will describe the data sources, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of 
each, and where possible pointing out the impact on the final quality of the data. Each 
data source will be analyzed with regards to richness (detail), inter-temporal 




The Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) 
The Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) maintained by the US census bureau is 
the primary source for federal expenditures. The data consists of federal expenditures or 
obligations distributed by state and local areas at the program level. The report is 
created by combining several statistics on federal government expenditures. The 
primary sources are:  Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), Federal 
Procurement Data System, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Personnel 
Management, U.S. Postal Service, and Federal Aids to State Survey. 
 
Most of the information is submitted by individual agencies to the federal reporting 
system. CFFR is available from 1983 – 2008, with more recent years made available as 
the reports are completed. The data is rich in detail as all spending is presented as 
individual programs identified by the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) 
number and geographical location and is available for over 1500 programs.  The CFFR 
data set does have a few alterations over time that mostly occurs in 1993. Data before 
1993 has the following differences from the data 1993 onwards: (i) there is no 
department classification or agency classification in the database. Most of the agencies 
and departments are inferred by the program ID or CFDA numbers present in the 
database. (ii)  Most salary, wage, and procurement data have generic program IDs, and 
thus cannot be identified by agency and department for Pre-1993 data, apart from 
Defense, Postal Service, and the FBI, which have special codes. Data 1993 onwards 
does not have this issue as agency coding is available for salary, wages and 
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procurement data. (iii) Certain agencies and branches are missing data pre-1993. These 
include Corps of Engineers – Civil Works, Executive Office of the President, and the 
Judicial Branch.  Further contact with Census Bureau indicated that it is not possible to 
recollect the missing information for pre-1993 data. Corps of Engineers – Civil Works 
is also missing for 2008. 
 
There are limitations in the coverage of CFFR data. Amounts excluded from the CFFR 
are grouped into two general categories - conceptual exclusions and agency/program 
omissions. Conceptual exclusions include spending not geographically distributed for 
example all international transactions and foreign payments, and also agencies not 
covered by the reporting systems. The reporting systems and federal agencies omit 
federal procurement, travel, and other expenditures to the extent that they are not 
covered by contractual agreements or government charge card purchases. Exclusions 
include: Net interest on federal government debt, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, National Security, Agency, Procurement actions of the judicial 
and legislative sectors of the federal government, Expenditures other than salaries and 
wages are not available for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit 
Union Administration, and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.  
 
An additional limitation of the CFFR is that it is not possible to identify whether the 
recipient of the expenditure is a state or local government or a private entity. This 
necessitates a third data source to account for federal expenditures to state 
governments.   Finally assistance spending may also involve obligations. Typically de-
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obligations are indicated as negative amounts in CFFR. It is difficult to track, by 
program, when obligations were made, and how to distribute the negative amounts in 
prior years. Thus, negative figures are retained, and appear as a subtraction from the 
aggregate estimation of the spending type. In summary, the CFFR data is rich in detail 
with the presentation of all spending at the program level allowing for flexibility in the 
creation of spending categories. 
 
 
State and Local Government Data Source 
The State and Local Government Finances maintained by the US Census Bureau is the 
data source for state and local government spending. Local governments specifically 
comprise of counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and independent 
school districts.  Activities of dependent public school systems are included with the 
data of their parent state or local government. This data is collected by the census 
bureau in 2 ways. First, the US Census Bureau conducts the nation’s Economic Census 
every five years, in years ending in “2” and “7”, where the census of governments is 
one component of the economic census. The US Census Bureau also conducts recurrent 
annual surveys related to the census of governments. Essentially four methods are used 
to collect the data: Mail Canvass, Compilation using direct government reports and 
records, central collection where other states share data from their own collection 
systems, and finally imputation for government units that did not respond. Imputation is 




The coverage is from 1977 to 2009, and the data is fairly consistent. One general issue 
is that local government spending is omitted for 2001 and 2003. Data users can either 
choose to interpolate these years, or use the totals for state government spending alone. 
The main limitation of this data source is the level of aggregation presented. This 
limitation essentially dictates the possible attainable spending categories for the SADS 
database in order to allow for spending comparisons across the different levels of 
government.  For instance research and regulation spending is typically included in 
spending aggregates, and it is impossible to separate out conservation efforts (forest 
conservation) and marketing efforts (timber production promotion) from spending 
under economic affairs. There is also certain unexpected bundling of expenditures, for 
instance environmental spending is under health spending.  
 
In summary, State and Local Government Finances is the most consistent database with 
regards to computation and collection across US states. Its main drawback is it level of 
disaggregation in spending categories. 
 
Federal Aid to States (FAS) 
Federal Aid to States (FAS) is the data source for federal spending directly to state 
governments. FAS is part of the CFFR series, and thus has the advantage that it is 
consistent with the main source of federal spending data for the SADS.   
 
Similar to the CFFR, the FAS data have been consolidated and tabulated by the Census 
Bureau under the auspices of the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 
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data in the FAS is similar to the CFFR apart from the fact that the former consists of 
federal grants to local and state governments and is available at the program level of 
disaggregation, while the latter has data on all grants both to government and non-
government entities with more aggregated data. Thus subtracting FAS data from CFFR 
would provide federal expenditures excluding spending on state and local governments. 
 
The FAS data includes the following:  Direct cash grants to state or local government 
units, payments for grants-in-kind, such as purchases of commodities distributed to 
state or local government institutions (e.g., school lunch and breakfast programs), 
payments to nongovernment entities when such payments result in cash or in-kind 
services passed on to state or local governments, payments to regional commissions and 
organizations that are redistributed to the state or local level, federal government 
payments to state and local governments for research and development that is an 
integral part of the provision of public services, and federal revenues shared with state 
and local governments. Specific exclusions from the FAS that are available in the 
CFFR are: federal government payments directly to individuals, profit or nonprofit 
institutions not covered above, and payments for services rendered. The FAS report 
was known as the Federal Expenditures by State prior to 1997. The available coverage 
is for the years 1981-2008. 
 
The main drawback of the FAS database is that spending is not presented at the 
program level and thus the level of disaggregation is much greater than CFFR.  This 
adds a further constraint on the possible degrees of spending disaggregation for the 
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SADS database. However, the aggregation categories can generally be matched to state 
level spending categories, and thus the limitation does not detract from the possible 
categories at the state and local level. Furthermore, there are several inconsistencies in 
the totals of the categories and subcategories for data before 1990s. The specific issue is 
that the category totals do not match with the totals of the subcategories. There are also 
inconsistencies between total state spending listed, and the total spending of all state 
sub-categories. The state sub-categories do not add up to the total state total for data 
after the 1990s.  Further communication with the US Census Bureau revealed that they 
are unable to provide documentation or account for the inconsistencies. For the SADS 
database, the total of the sub-categories of spending in the FAS are used as they are 
essentially what is required for creating the categories. Thus it is assumed that the error 
is in either calculation of the totals in the FAS dataset, or there are missing categories. 
 
In summary, the FAS data is the most problematic of all 3 data sources due to its level 
of disaggregation and inconsistencies in totals. However, it is the consistent with the 
CFFR data, and as far as the author knows, the best available data for expenditures by 
federal government to state governments. 
 
 
3. Procedures For Resolving Issues 
 
 
There are essentially two issues that have to be accounted for in the creation of the 
SADS database. The first is the treatment of administrative spending in the CFFR data 
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source. Second is the removal of direct spending by federal governments to state 
governments in order to avoid double counting. 
 
Treatment of Administrative Expenditures 
Administrative expenditures are allocated by department for the CFFR data 1993 
onwards.  If all the programs in a department can be identified under one category of 
spending, the administrative expenditures are then included in that spending category. 
However, when a whole department does not fall under one category of spending, the 
administrative expenditures are distributed into different spending categories in the 
department by the ratio of each type of spending over total department spending.  
 





=     
                                                                                
Where ijadst is administrative spending for category i in department j. ijtot is the total 
spending for category j in department i, while jtot is the total spending in department j 
excluding un-allocable administrative expenditures. Therefore 
i
ij jtot tot=∑ . Finally 
jadst  is the un-allocable administrative spending for department j. The assumption is 
that administrative spending is proportional to the amount of spending per category in 




In the case of pre-1993 data, the administrative spending is not allocated by department. 
Thus the administrative spending is first allocated to each department by the proportion 
of department spending over total spending. This is then further distributed into the 
type of spending within the department, using the proportion of the category of 
spending in the department over total department spending.  Thus administrative 
spending is spread over departments using the following formula: 
 




=                                                                                   
 
Where jadst  is the administrative spending for department j, jtot is the total spending 
in department j, tot  is the total spending in CFFR excluding un-allocable 
administrative spending such that 
j
jtot tot=∑  and adst is the un-allocable total 
administrative for the whole of CFFR. The assumption is that administrative spending 
is proportional to the amount of spending per department.  
 
Excluding Federal Grants to States 
The most significant obstacle in disaggregating federal, state and local spending is the 
possibility of double counting. For example, in the CFFR, federal spending on states is 
counted as federal expenditures.  However, databases on state government spending 
would count such expenditures as state government spending. Thus such items would 
be double counted. In order to remove double counting, the Federal Aid to States (FAS) 




Each spending category is identified in the FAS dataset that corresponds to the 
categories created in the CFFR data.  Thus the final categories for direct federal 
spending are created by a simple subtraction as indicated in equation (3) below: 
 
(3)                                  SADS CFFR FASfedsp fedsp fedsp= −             
                                                    
Where fedsp is the spending category, and the subscript indicates the database. 
Therefore we subtract out transfers from the federal government to the state 
governments from federal spending. The accuracy of federal spending in the SADS 
database is dependent on the degree of consistency of the categories between CFFR and 
FAS. Under the assumption that the FAS data comprehensively covers all federal 
spending to states, the SADS data can be considered reasonably consistent. 
 
  
4. Description of SADS Categories 
 
There are essentially 9 categories of spending in the SADS database: (i) Education, (ii) 
Health, (iii) Social Security & Welfare, (iv) Housing, (v) Public Order and Safety, (vi) 
Parks, Libraries, Arts, and Humanities, (vii) Infrastructure and Communication, (viii) 
Economic Affairs & Private Subsidies, and (ix) Other Spending. Spending by state and 
local governments exactly match each of the above aggregate categories, apart from 
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Economic affairs & private spending and other spending. However, federal spending 
has to be aggregated over individual programs in order to generate similar categories. 
 
For federal spending, each program is identified by department, and categorized under 
the above categories. This identification is done using the program description provided 
in the data, or obtained by tracking the CFDA number for each program through other 
sources. Each type of spending can be broken down into two groups – direct spending 
and assistance spending. Direct spending includes grants, salaries and wages, 
procurement contracts, and other direct payments. Direct assistance includes direct 
loans, guaranteed/insured loans and insurance. The components of direct spending and 
assistance spending are presented in table 1. 
 
A few departments have more than one type of government spending. Each program is 
classified by spending type by department. For instance, in the department of 
Agriculture, about 37% of department spending on average for all states was on private 
subsidies in 2008. The top private subsidy is crop insurance, which typically accounts 
for most of the Agricultural spending on private subsidies in addition to production 
stabilization and flexibility payments. However, Agricultural spending on Food stamps 
and school lunch programs account for about 21% of Agricultural department spending, 
both of which fall under the category of social welfare.  
 
All spending in the database is presented as shares of total government spending. 





There are three variables available under education: the share of education 
spending by state and local governments over total state and local government 
spending, the share of direct education spending by federal governments over 
total direct federal spending, and finally the share of federal education loans and 
insurance spending over federal total loans and insurance spending. State and 
local education spending is categorized according to the Government State and 
Local Finances database as spending under education. This spending category 
includes essentially all spending involved in the operation, maintenance, and 
construction of public schools and education institutions for all levels of 
education. The corresponding federal categories include education spending by 
the department of education, and typically most expenditure carried out by 
departments that involve education or labor training programs. 
 
2) Health 
There are two variables available under health: the share of health spending by 
state and local governments over total spending by state and local governments, 
and the share of direct health spending by federal governments over total direct 
spending by federal governments. State and local health spending is categorized 
according to the Government State and Local Finances database as spending 
under health. This spending category includes essentially all spending towards 
the provision of services for the conservation and improvement of public health 
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and financial support of other governments’ health programs.  However, 
environmental programs are also included under state and local health spending. 
The corresponding federal category includes spending by the department of 
health. Federal environmental spending by the EPA is not included in this 
category, but is available as a spate category in case users would like to include 
it. 
 
3) Social Welfare 
There are two variables available under social welfare: the share of social 
welfare and social security spending by state and local governments over total 
state and local government spending, and the share of direct social welfare and 
social security spending by federal governments over total direct federal 
spending. State and local social welfare and security spending encompasses 
public welfare spending, employment security administration, employee 
retirement spending, unemployment and workers compensation spending. The 
corresponding federal categories include spending over a wide range of federal 
departments. Social security administration, Earned income tax credit from the 
treasury department, food stamps from the department of agriculture, retirement 
and disability payments, as well as weatherization assistance to low income 
households, and Unemployment trust funds.  
 
4) Housing 
There are three variables available under housing: the share of housing spending 
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by state and local governments over total state and local government spending, 
the share of direct housing spending by federal governments over total direct 
federal spending, and finally the share of federal housing loans and insurance 
spending over total federal loans and insurance spending. State and local 
housing spending encompasses construction, operation, and support of housing 
and redevelopment projects and other activities to promote or aid public and 
private housing and community development. The corresponding federal 
categories mostly include housing spending by the department of housing and 
urban development. A few programs by other departments are also included, for 
example spending on rural housing by the department of Agriculture.  
 
5) Public Order and Safety 
There are three variables available under public order and safety: the share of 
public order and safety spending by state and local governments over total state 
and local government spending, the share of direct public order and safety 
spending by federal governments over total direct federal spending, and finally 
the share of federal public order and safety loans and insurance spending over 
total federal loans and insurance spending. State and local public order and 
safety spending encompasses judicial and legal, legislative activities, police 
protection, corrections institutions, protective inspection and regulation, and fire 
protection spending. The corresponding federal categories include spending by 
the department of justice, homeland security programs, and spending by the 




6) Parks, Libraries, Arts and Humanities 
There are two variables available under parks, libraries, arts and humanities: the 
share of parks, libraries spending by state and local governments over total state 
and local government spending, and the share of direct federal spending on 
parks, libraries, arts and humanities over total direct federal spending. State and 
local spending involves spending on public libraries, and parks and recreation.  
The corresponding federal categories essentially include spending by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Sciences, National Park Service, National 
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, Tennessee Valley Authority, 
Appalachian Region Commission. 
 
7) Infrastructure and Communication 
There are three variables available under infrastructure and communication: the 
share of infrastructure and communication spending by state and local 
governments over total state and local government spending, the share of direct 
federal infrastructure and communication spending over total direct federal 
spending, and finally the share of federal infrastructure and communication 
loans and insurance spending over total federal loans and insurance spending. 
State and local infrastructure and communication spending includes general 
public buildings, highways, sanitation, sea and inland port facilities, and transit 
utilities. The corresponding federal spending encompasses a wide range of 
departments that engage in infrastructure spending. However the main 
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categories include spending by the department of transportation, development 
grants for public works by the department of commerce, water resources 
development, and flood insurance.  
 
8) Economic Affairs and Private Subsidies 
There are three variables available under economic affairs and private subsidies: 
the share of economic affairs and private subsidies by state and local 
governments over total by state and local government spending, the share of 
direct economic affairs and private subsidies spending by federal governments 
over total direct federal spending, and finally the share of federal economic 
affairs and private subsidy loans and insurance spending over total federal loans 
and insurance spending. State and local economic affairs and private subsidy 
spending involve spending in economic affairs (agriculture, fishing, forestry, 
and mining), miscellaneous commercial activities, utility spending (water, gas, 
and electric) and liquor store spending.  Economic affairs tends to cover most of 
private subsidies, however it is difficult to disaggregate conservation and 
regulation efforts for state and local spending, and thus this category includes 
not just private subsidies but other types of spending that falls under economic 
affairs. Federal spending categories are made consistent with this definition. 
They essentially involve spending by the department of agriculture excluding 
food stamps ad extension services, the department of interior, and small 
business administration. A few programs in each of these departments are under 




9) Other Spending 
The three variables include other spending by state and local governments, 
federal direct spending, and federal loans and assistance spending. At the state 
level, the bulk of this spending is those that are hard to categorize. This includes 
spending on parking facilities, veterans bonuses, general un-allocable spending, 
and administration spending that cannot be categorized under the above 
categories. Federal spending mostly includes defense spending, veterans’ 
affairs, general services administration and various international programs. This 
category is the most disparate when comparing the state and federal levels.  
 
10) Separate Federal Categories  
There are two separate federal categories available to data users. These include 
spending by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and federal research 
programs that are difficult to categorize under the above programs, for instance 
the National Science Foundation (NSF), and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). It may make sense to include NSF spending under 
education spending, however it is worth noting that research under NSF is 
broad, and encompasses several categories in the SADS database. This is 
complicated by the fact that research spending under is already included each 
individual category at the state level. Thus, it is up to the user to decide how 
they wish to allocation NSF, NASA, and EPA spending. EPA spending is a 
separate category mostly due to the design of the state spending categories. 
93 
 
Environmental spending by states is included under health spending, and it is 
not possible to separate the two. Users may be uncomfortable combining health 
spending and EPA spending at the federal level, and thus the option is left to 
their discretion.  
 
5. The Use of SADS Data 
 
This section essentially consists of three parts. First excerpts are provided from the data 
to give the reader a feel for what is available in the SADS database. Second, an 
example is provided of how the SADS database can be used to observe the evolution of 
spending over time across states. Finally, a simple study is conducted to explore the 
possibility of substitution or complementarities for the same spending categories but 
across different levels of government. Finally, some caveats are provided with regards 
to how to interpret the data. 
 
Excerpt from SADS 
 
Tables 2 through 4 provide trends of all categories of spending, averaged over all states, 
for state and local governments, federal direct spending, and federal loans and 
insurance. Federal direct spending includes grants, salaries and wages, and procurement 
contracts. From this data much can be inferred about the inter-temporal movements of 




Tables 5 through 7 provide cross-state comparisons of spending averaged over 1983-
2008. This data is provided for all the SADS categories as well as for state and local 
governments, federal direct spending, and federal assistance spending (federal loans 
and insurance). In additional to the shares of spending provided, total expenditures for 
each state over time will also be provided in case users would like to work with real 
values instead of shares.  
 
 
Changes in Social Welfare, Health, and Education Spending 
 
A simple illustration of what can be done using the SADS database is shown in tables 
8, 9 and 10. Welfare, health and education spending shares are tracked over decade 
averages of 1983-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008. Social welfare and health spending 
involve state and local spending, and federal direct spending, while education spending 
additionally includes federal loans and insurance.  
 
Perhaps not surprising, the one striking feature is that the differences across the 
spending shares of states is far greater than the differences over time for each state. 
Health and social welfare spending shares have gone up for most states from the 80s to 
the 90s, however the trends have been mixed moving into the 2000s, as some states 
have experienced increases in the spending shares while others have declined. The 
federal direct spending on education consists of mostly grants and administrative costs. 
The better indication of education spending is the assistance spending in terms of loans. 
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Most of the assistance spending provided in table 10 involves student loans, and the 
changes across the years for states vary significantly. Contrast the District of Columbia 
where overall the loans have been on an upward trend to Minnesota, which has 
experienced sharp declines. In contrast, state and local spending on education over time 
has been mostly flat for both Minnesota and the District of Columbia. The SADS data 
provides finer annual data as opposed to the decadal averages presented and thus these 
trends can be studied in further detail. 
 
 
Complementarities and Substitution of spending shares across levels of 
government 
 
Table 10 and 11 present the correlations of education, health, and social welfare and 
security spending shares across government levels, and specifically for education, 
across federal direct and assistance spending as well. These are pair-wise correlation, 
all of them significant at 1%. A few interesting results stand out. For instance state 
spending on education is negatively correlated with both federal direct and assistance 
spending, both with a correlation around -0.10. This may indicate some degree of 
substitutability between state and federal spending in terms of education. In contrast 
federal spending shares in education for direct and assistance spending is positively 
correlated at 0.30. Since federal direct education spending mostly captures 
administrative spending, it makes sense that there would be a high positive correlation 




We also find a negative correlation between federal and state level spending share on 
health of around -0.072, implying a degree of substitution between federal spending 
and state and local spending in health. However, with regards to social security and 
welfare spending, we find a positive correlation of 0.19 indicating some degree of 
complementarities between state and federal social security and welfare spending. 
 
Caveats about the use of SADS 
 
Thus far, the potential inconsistencies across spending categories and the limitation of 
accuracy due to different category aggregation across data sources have been 
mentioned as potential drawbacks. One additional drawback is the interpretation of 
spending.  Recall that federal spending is direct federal spending to individuals in states 
(as opposed to state governments), while for state level spending, this may include 
federal spending as long as the delivery through state governments. Thus conceptually, 
the distinction between federal and state level government spending is really by 
delivery. Any analyses on the effectiveness of federal spending in the SADS database 
will be unable to make statements about the overall efficacy of federal spending, since 
federal spending visa states may still be efficient. The analyses can mainly make 







This document has presented a unique dataset on US government spending allocation 
for a set of government spending categories by state and local as well as federal 
governments distributed over states for the years 1983-2008. The unique feature of this 
database is that it provides disaggregated government spending categories by federal 
and state and local governments levels distributed over states and also limits the overlap 
of expenditures between the different government levels. The drawbacks have been 
specified, and also the procedures to handle different issues have been described. A few 
illustrations were provided on how this data may be used by researchers. Finally, this 
database will be updated regularly as the data sources are updated. Furthermore, the 
codebooks for the aggregation of each type of federal spending program into respective 
spending categories will be made available online for users to create new sub-
categories or submit possible errors that will be corrected with each round of updates. 









Table 1: Direct Spending and Assistance 
 
Direct Spending Assistance 
Grants (Block,  Formula,  Project, and 
Cooperative Agreements) 
Salaries and Wages 
Procurement Contracts 
Retirement and Disability Payments for 
Individuals 
Other Direct Payments for Individuals 







Table 2: Annual Shares of State & Local Government Spending Categories over Total State 




























Table 3: Annual Shares of Federal Direct Government Spending Categories over Total 
Federal Direct Government Spending averaged over all States. Direct spending includes 






















Table 4: Annual Shares of Federal Government Loans and Insurance Spending Categories 
over Total Federal Government Loans and Insurance averaged over all States 













1983 6.47 20.64 32.09 4.55 31.50 4.72 
1984 9.71 25.99 30.86 2.85 25.66 4.89 
1985 10.32 18.43 36.74 2.04 27.89 4.55 
1986 6.31 27.86 37.04 1.75 22.15 4.85 
1987 4.91 38.37 32.25 1.20 18.11 5.13 
1988 6.96 28.70 38.57 1.42 20.63 3.70 
1989 7.01 36.44 36.03 0.87 16.92 2.70 
1990 7.50 32.64 36.51 1.38 18.83 3.12 
1991 8.03 33.72 34.83 1.53 19.41 2.45 
1992 7.22 26.92 43.30 1.32 19.46 1.76 
1993 7.27 29.44 40.93 1.51 18.19 2.64 
1994 7.63 32.60 36.32 1.25 16.55 5.63 
1995 9.01 18.64 41.54 1.31 25.59 3.87 
1996 9.00 22.15 42.23 1.04 21.57 3.98 
1997 9.92 20.93 47.62 0.95 17.39 3.17 
1998 10.38 23.36 45.48 1.00 16.24 3.54 
1999 9.96 19.92 45.59 1.13 17.79 5.60 
2000 9.90 20.86 47.96 1.38 17.62 2.28 
2001 8.98 22.71 46.82 1.28 17.65 2.54 
2002 9.48 25.42 44.37 1.62 16.41 2.70 
2003 10.02 26.17 43.57 1.72 15.70 2.81 
2004 12.27 19.65 44.17 1.45 16.19 6.26 
2005 13.33 12.80 51.04 2.00 16.31 4.51 
2006 11.70 11.58 54.49 0.97 16.81 4.44 
2007 11.77 10.91 54.77 1.11 17.36 4.07 


















Table 5: Shares of State & Local Government Spending Categories over Total State and 


















































Table 6: Shares of Federal Direct Government Spending Categories over Total Federal 
Direct Government Spending by Geographical Location (1983-2008 average). Direct 






















































Table 7: Shares of Federal Government Loans and Insurance Spending Categories over 



















Alabama 8.89 18.62 53.12 2.10 12.95 4.31 
Alaska 1.33 45.23 28.63 5.00 10.27 9.53 
Arizona 10.30 38.49 37.82 0.66 5.93 6.79 
Arkansas 5.71 32.74 22.17 2.59 33.23 3.55 
California 5.53 22.96 57.30 0.10 10.71 3.38 
Colorado 8.70 41.91 23.85 1.43 16.14 7.96 
Connecticut 6.48 19.04 67.03 0.21 5.51 1.71 
Delaware 2.52 10.11 79.63 0.54 4.96 2.25 
District of 
Columbia 35.27 31.65 5.69 0.00 25.29 2.05 
Florida 0.58 3.18 94.23 0.08 1.20 0.72 
Georgia 4.46 26.87 45.36 3.59 15.04 4.66 
Hawaii 1.21 15.15 78.25 0.33 3.17 1.89 
Idaho 5.98 33.11 26.48 1.12 28.07 5.23 
Illinois 10.31 31.12 25.14 1.32 28.84 3.26 
Indiana 21.60 26.89 22.23 1.07 24.76 3.45 
Iowa 8.24 7.01 9.41 1.41 72.71 1.21 
Kansas 8.56 18.20 19.38 1.56 48.42 3.86 
Kentucky 9.40 23.06 36.51 5.03 21.98 4.00 
Louisiana 0.84 3.07 92.09 0.47 3.09 0.44 
Maine 10.46 22.09 50.49 2.73 9.82 4.35 
Maryland 3.89 43.40 43.25 0.26 2.97 5.99 
Massachusetts 16.53 13.45 60.64 0.31 7.25 1.79 
Michigan 14.40 34.94 28.37 1.61 16.34 4.32 
Minnesota 13.88 29.22 8.28 1.72 43.90 2.98 
Mississippi 2.83 11.35 60.61 1.54 22.00 1.66 
Missouri 10.59 31.48 28.06 2.02 23.68 4.15 
Montana 7.20 23.06 15.74 2.03 48.90 3.05 
Nebraska 8.94 10.37 17.58 0.54 59.74 2.83 
Nevada 1.77 46.57 39.50 0.28 3.70 8.19 
New 
Hampshire 13.22 26.94 41.51 2.68 10.00 5.63 
New Jersey 2.62 10.18 84.58 0.06 1.54 1.01 
New Mexico 6.88 32.81 39.32 2.90 10.30 7.78 
New York 15.38 18.92 54.26 0.24 10.14 1.05 
North 
Carolina 2.84 16.66 59.73 1.66 14.91 4.20 
North Dakota 3.37 8.22 16.52 2.25 68.71 0.91 
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Ohio 12.90 37.98 25.70 1.10 16.84 5.45 
Oklahoma 9.53 29.48 33.02 2.94 19.24 5.78 
Oregon 8.70 28.44 45.36 1.17 12.68 3.62 
Pennsylvania 19.06 20.60 51.60 1.04 4.87 2.81 
Rhode Island 11.47 13.86 69.34 0.19 3.67 1.46 
South 
Carolina 1.68 6.54 84.36 1.42 4.23 1.77 
South Dakota 6.36 12.35 9.50 3.43 66.36 1.97 
Tennessee 8.79 44.44 24.45 1.85 14.20 6.25 
Texas 2.69 13.04 74.13 0.45 7.57 2.13 
Utah 7.57 57.18 10.26 0.97 18.98 5.04 
Vermont 24.41 12.28 40.69 2.59 17.49 2.49 
Virginia 4.63 27.56 52.62 1.68 5.22 8.28 
Washington 7.08 35.38 34.15 0.38 14.58 8.41 
West Virginia 12.10 12.37 65.06 1.80 6.27 2.39 
Wisconsin 24.54 18.26 20.48 2.26 28.82 5.58 





































Table 8: Shares of State & Local Government Spending Categories over Total State & 
Local Government Spending over Time and Geographical Location  
 


















Alabama 31.89 29.73 32.71 12.77 14.80 13.28 11.84 17.76 23.00 
Alaska 21.17 20.82 21.62 2.77 3.30 2.86 9.29 15.62 21.39 
Arizona 31.17 29.89 28.87 4.15 4.30 5.41 10.85 17.04 22.16 
Arkansas 36.99 34.28 35.08 8.57 8.83 6.65 16.77 21.90 25.82 
California 26.13 24.33 26.87 7.25 7.90 7.28 20.86 21.91 24.24 
Colorado 30.80 30.67 30.12 6.53 5.42 6.09 14.97 17.91 21.78 
Connecticut 27.88 26.67 28.87 6.33 6.76 6.96 18.74 23.37 25.33 
Delaware 34.58 33.50 32.10 4.59 5.04 5.59 11.10 16.24 20.48 
District of 
Columbia 12.81 12.15 15.43 7.36 8.15 7.02 19.04 24.90 20.71 
Florida 28.21 26.77 26.83 9.22 8.51 7.13 9.57 14.43 20.75 
Georgia 28.52 30.43 34.67 14.84 11.84 8.08 12.55 17.62 22.49 
Hawaii 24.17 21.21 26.47 6.18 6.63 8.08 17.63 18.60 22.09 
Idaho 33.30 33.85 32.04 8.72 8.37 7.49 15.43 18.22 23.90 
Illinois 29.25 28.78 28.91 5.48 5.84 5.67 20.27 21.81 26.05 
Indiana 36.75 36.64 34.76 9.09 9.07 7.22 15.03 17.99 21.96 
Iowa 34.99 34.69 34.17 8.89 9.89 9.76 15.64 17.80 23.26 
Kansas 34.23 34.71 34.28 7.26 7.95 6.74 12.99 14.91 20.63 
Kentucky 30.88 30.23 30.30 5.84 5.83 5.98 18.28 24.41 29.90 
Louisiana 27.15 27.58 28.61 10.20 12.33 11.15 17.82 21.18 22.71 
Maine 31.28 30.43 27.47 4.24 4.70 5.90 22.90 27.80 30.95 
Maryland 30.56 31.37 32.20 4.29 4.22 5.07 16.69 20.04 23.19 
Massachusetts 23.50 22.48 24.93 7.77 6.96 4.90 22.60 25.31 26.98 
Michigan 32.06 34.39 35.79 8.82 8.40 8.52 22.53 22.41 23.92 
Minnesota 29.51 29.77 29.97 7.20 7.58 4.78 19.13 22.50 30.29 
Mississippi 31.85 31.41 29.41 14.10 13.56 11.49 15.12 19.22 26.92 
Missouri 33.16 32.82 31.39 9.43 7.91 8.20 14.71 19.84 25.94 
Montana 33.48 33.38 31.25 4.79 5.45 6.51 17.97 20.54 21.29 
Nebraska 28.00 30.81 29.90 7.40 6.62 6.47 9.36 13.29 19.97 
Nevada 23.45 25.32 28.69 7.33 6.64 5.76 15.87 18.00 17.60 
New 
Hampshire 31.63 30.90 33.23 4.93 3.03 2.70 13.53 23.08 23.89 
New Jersey 29.46 30.13 31.80 5.16 4.32 4.43 17.17 21.28 24.63 
New Mexico 34.71 32.12 32.60 7.25 8.54 7.03 12.40 18.19 25.81 
New York 24.18 23.23 23.45 8.45 7.91 6.84 21.78 26.27 30.64 
North 
Carolina 34.31 31.32 32.12 8.27 11.39 10.36 12.97 17.60 23.63 
North Dakota 34.70 33.70 32.57 4.69 2.97 2.40 15.84 20.55 22.98 
Ohio 30.48 29.80 29.73 7.14 7.04 6.98 25.61 27.59 31.69 
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Oklahoma 33.52 33.39 34.56 8.53 8.96 5.99 16.91 20.32 24.95 
Oregon 31.77 29.81 27.28 5.32 6.64 7.11 14.96 20.21 28.27 
Pennsylvania 29.20 30.08 28.99 5.06 5.09 5.76 22.67 25.30 30.94 
Rhode Island 28.44 27.06 26.85 6.49 5.12 3.65 23.16 26.18 32.77 
South 
Carolina 33.40 30.31 30.10 11.68 13.73 11.98 12.69 19.45 24.11 
South Dakota 31.10 31.76 30.02 4.61 4.66 4.21 11.74 16.11 22.22 
Tennessee 24.55 24.98 25.98 8.85 9.72 8.28 12.84 17.55 26.62 
Texas 35.05 34.09 35.35 7.44 8.22 7.17 11.12 17.18 22.16 
Utah 31.06 33.53 34.64 4.89 5.76 6.48 11.33 14.32 18.55 
Vermont 34.91 35.99 36.80 3.76 2.38 2.54 15.90 20.61 25.43 
Virginia 35.55 33.95 34.60 8.08 7.33 7.69 11.60 15.42 19.78 
Washington 26.32 27.58 28.21 5.51 7.14 8.49 17.56 20.36 24.31 
West Virginia 32.67 31.72 31.44 6.41 5.58 4.55 21.64 28.62 29.79 
Wisconsin 34.19 34.22 31.99 6.66 5.50 5.41 20.76 21.89 26.77 





































Table 9: Shares of Federal Direct Spending Categories over Total Federal Direct Spending 
by Time and Geographical Location 
Direct spending includes grants, salaries and wages, and procurement contracts 
 



















Alabama 1.87 1.18 0.89 12.24 16.21 17.90 46.57 45.67 41.45 
Alaska 0.93 0.82 1.15 6.63 9.27 9.63 18.30 22.85 20.71 
Arizona 1.51 0.85 1.51 10.63 15.54 15.37 40.56 45.01 40.78 
Arkansas 1.19 1.25 1.30 13.01 18.44 20.21 48.37 53.66 51.05 
California 1.37 1.26 1.20 12.74 17.72 23.06 31.89 39.29 39.18 
Colorado 1.51 1.42 1.39 9.71 11.90 13.84 34.33 34.92 35.34 
Connecticut 1.06 0.83 0.79 10.30 18.65 21.03 31.67 42.44 37.14 
Delaware 0.91 1.02 1.12 11.96 16.71 19.74 46.51 50.87 53.41 
District of 
Columbia 8.09 4.84 3.86 11.75 8.74 5.75 41.45 25.54 15.63 
Florida 1.10 0.84 0.96 14.86 20.16 24.94 46.38 47.99 46.01 
Georgia 1.22 1.01 2.23 9.23 14.74 18.85 40.01 42.87 41.00 
Hawaii 0.41 0.69 0.63 5.37 8.46 10.68 28.11 34.56 32.97 
Idaho 1.75 1.51 0.96 11.38 12.78 12.61 50.64 47.36 44.15 
Illinois 2.41 1.48 1.20 17.11 21.68 23.85 52.03 52.87 48.47 
Indiana 1.86 4.36 4.57 12.64 18.14 19.57 48.74 51.61 48.18 
Iowa 2.04 2.05 1.99 14.02 17.47 19.88 48.26 48.55 48.17 
Kansas 1.87 1.25 1.69 11.22 16.42 17.55 36.94 43.97 41.43 
Kentucky 1.48 1.39 1.65 13.02 15.92 19.00 53.85 51.50 44.42 
Louisiana 2.08 1.46 2.58 10.75 18.25 21.35 43.56 46.59 40.88 
Maine 1.49 1.19 0.86 12.87 15.25 17.62 44.38 44.29 46.72 
Maryland 1.20 0.90 0.87 11.64 18.07 23.03 39.03 39.51 33.40 
Massachusetts 1.88 1.59 1.60 14.80 22.37 27.58 32.54 39.12 38.10 
Michigan 2.05 1.23 0.98 18.39 23.41 25.27 53.62 56.48 53.47 
Minnesota 4.14 3.77 2.49 12.32 17.47 21.30 41.20 47.48 46.85 
Mississippi 1.69 1.38 1.32 10.39 15.09 16.56 40.50 45.53 41.79 
Missouri 1.20 0.94 2.01 10.61 15.75 18.13 35.80 42.52 42.42 
Montana 1.44 1.77 1.28 11.07 14.62 16.71 45.60 43.84 44.33 
Nebraska 2.42 2.97 4.29 11.47 15.31 16.48 42.42 44.73 40.76 
Nevada 1.11 0.55 0.41 12.59 13.91 14.96 43.79 47.99 48.01 
New 
Hampshire 0.65 1.32 1.24 10.78 16.31 17.56 39.60 48.15 48.20 
New Jersey 1.63 0.82 0.77 15.04 20.39 24.44 45.98 50.22 48.76 
New Mexico 2.99 1.43 1.48 11.88 11.37 11.16 42.91 35.42 31.74 
New York 3.41 2.28 1.66 17.06 23.81 28.36 45.49 51.00 48.96 
North 
Carolina 1.46 1.06 1.09 11.77 16.43 18.89 46.35 48.94 48.04 
North Dakota 1.26 1.39 1.86 10.57 15.27 13.99 31.14 36.82 31.57 
Ohio 1.72 1.32 2.33 14.64 20.23 25.08 49.45 51.77 47.80 
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Oklahoma 1.44 1.42 1.05 12.06 16.80 18.62 44.03 45.87 43.83 
Oregon 1.49 1.43 1.04 15.67 18.08 19.16 58.77 57.92 55.75 
Pennsylvania 2.19 1.43 1.55 17.16 23.28 26.61 52.08 52.51 48.45 
Rhode Island 1.48 1.70 2.93 14.12 18.80 23.70 44.28 47.94 46.04 
South 
Carolina 1.04 1.14 1.72 9.37 12.58 15.31 44.29 45.28 45.51 
South Dakota 2.83 2.09 9.79 11.94 16.65 14.47 41.00 41.78 34.05 
Tennessee 1.91 1.21 1.09 15.29 17.48 20.40 52.21 46.88 43.02 
Texas 1.51 1.49 1.37 10.94 15.50 16.58 35.83 41.69 38.23 
Utah 2.25 2.23 1.83 7.88 11.02 12.30 38.82 44.62 42.27 
Vermont 2.21 2.66 2.21 14.94 18.54 19.00 48.85 52.32 45.46 
Virginia 1.46 1.51 2.66 8.04 10.64 10.91 28.80 28.65 23.43 
Washington 1.61 1.01 0.86 9.94 13.71 15.61 38.42 43.00 41.18 
West Virginia 2.11 1.42 0.98 14.42 18.74 20.80 65.63 59.82 54.60 
Wisconsin 2.64 2.06 1.88 16.38 20.62 21.00 53.42 55.50 52.54 





































Table 10: Shares of Federal Government Loans and Insurance Spending 




1983-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 
Alabama 4.16 10.48 10.79 
Alaska 0.42 0.54 2.92 
Arizona 4.54 6.67 18.81 
Arkansas 2.48 5.84 8.07 
California 5.56 4.29 6.90 
Colorado 4.40 8.22 12.59 
Connecticut 8.89 5.09 6.15 
Delaware 2.91 2.18 2.61 
District of Columbia 36.99 20.08 50.81 
Florida 0.60 0.46 0.71 
Georgia 2.05 4.32 6.51 
Hawaii 1.91 0.79 1.13 
Idaho 3.96 5.57 7.99 
Illinois 8.26 8.38 14.05 
Indiana 6.87 39.57 13.09 
Iowa 4.07 8.19 11.53 
Kansas 14.03 3.55 9.86 
Kentucky 3.82 10.09 12.97 
Louisiana 0.45 0.87 1.12 
Maine 8.84 10.85 11.29 
Maryland 3.94 3.08 4.75 
Massachusetts 15.45 17.27 16.55 
Michigan 10.64 13.08 18.80 
Minnesota 21.38 9.70 12.70 
Mississippi 1.87 2.89 3.51 
Missouri 6.07 9.27 15.57 
Montana 3.58 7.69 9.48 
Nebraska 7.31 9.94 9.09 
Nevada 1.76 0.86 2.78 
New Hampshire 10.79 12.97 15.39 
New Jersey 3.55 2.24 2.33 
New Mexico 4.89 7.78 7.44 
New York 20.88 12.16 14.67 
North Carolina 1.46 2.80 3.95 
North Dakota 2.32 3.28 4.28 
Ohio 10.46 11.21 16.68 
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Oklahoma 3.44 10.43 13.26 
Oregon 8.43 8.38 9.27 
Pennsylvania 14.87 20.59 20.62 
Rhode Island 13.93 9.32 11.95 
South Carolina 0.97 1.87 2.02 
South Dakota 5.14 6.41 7.26 
Tennessee 4.52 8.88 12.03 
Texas 1.64 3.20 2.92 
Utah 5.75 7.96 8.56 
Vermont 19.38 25.75 26.83 
Virginia 2.47 4.79 6.13 
Washington 4.77 7.78 8.10 
West Virginia 15.47 7.20 14.94 
Wisconsin 17.93 30.79 22.76 
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Table 12: Health and Social Security & Welfare – Complementarities and 
Substitution of Spending Shares Government Levels 
 
 Federal Direct Health Spending 
 
State Health Spending -0.0718*** 
  
 Federal Direct Social Security & Welfare Spending 
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Chapter 3: Fiscal spending for economic growth in the 
presence of imperfect markets 
 




This paper shows theoretically and empirically that under imperfect credit markets and 
increasing social returns to human capital, government spending on social and public 
goods (including education, health, social transfers, and pure public goods) promotes a 
faster rate of economic growth while government spending on non-social subsidies 
(credit subsidies to firms, farm subsidies, and many others) is toxic for growth. The 
basic conceptual story is simple: Credit rationing affects a subset of households, which 
leads to aggregate underinvestment and scarcity of human capital, but aggregate 
investment in physical capital is unaffected even if a large portion of the firms are 
affected by credit rationing. 
 The essence of this asymmetry emanates from imperfect substitutability of human 
capital investment across households in contrast to perfect substitutability of physical 
capital across firms.  Underinvestment in human capital by one household (due to credit 
rationing) cannot be offset by a corresponding increase in investment by another 
household because other household factors (innate ability) are fixed and cannot be 
transferred across households.  Thus credit market imperfections affecting households 
reduce  the aggregate level of human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993); even more 
importantly, to the extent that human capital facilitates the creation and adaptation of 
new productive ideas, a lower level of aggregate human capital reduces total factor 
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productivity growth, which may cause a permanent fall in the rate of economic growth. 
On the other hand, a reduction in physical capital in one firm (due to credit rationing) 
can be offset by a corresponding increase in another firm (not subject to credit 
rationing) because other factors (labor) can move freely across firms.  Thus the 
allocation of physical capital, and therefore credit, across firms may, under certain 
plausible conditions to be rigorously examined below, be immaterial for economic 
growth over the long run.   
 The implication for government spending is clear. As long as spending on social 
goods mitigates the negative effects of credit rationing on households’ investment in 
human capital, an increase in social spending will increase human capital and, 
potentially, the rate of productivity growth.  In contrast, fiscal spending on non-social 
subsidies, even if directed to credit-constrained firms, may only affect the distribution 
of investments between credit-constrained and unconstrained firms but not the 
aggregate level of investments in physical capital by firms. Moreover, non-social 
government subsidies increase the incentives for firms to devote scarce human capital 
to rent-seeking activities needed to grab such subsidies subtracting human capital not 
only from directly productive activities but, more importantly, from the process of 
creation and adaptation of new productive ideas, perhaps the most vital role of human 
capital (Murphy et.al., 1991; Acemoglu, 1996). Hence non-social fiscal subsidies 
reduce the rate of growth of total factor productivity leading to a permanent reduction 
of the rate of economic growth. Furthermore, social spending in comparison to non-
social subsidies may not induce rent-seeking to the same extent because the benefits of 
social spending are widely distributed, whereas the costs of lobbying are private.  
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Hence, one may expect that, unlike non-social subsidies, social spending will not have 
a large effect on rent-seeking.10   
We first formalize these ideas by integrating several strands of a vast literature 
on market failures to develop a model that directly links fiscal expenditure patterns with 
productivity growth and investment. Specifically, we use ideas from the literature on 
credit market failure and human capital investment (Galor and Zeira, 1993), human 
capital accumulation and its spillovers on productivity growth (Acemoglu, 1996; 
Murphy et. al., 1991), and the flexibility of firms in adapting to market imperfections 
affecting only one factor of production (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Carter and 
Barham, 1996).  We empirically test the hypothesis presented at the outset of this paper 
by establishing an unusually close link between the theoretical and empirical models by 
using a new empirical strategy that mitigates some of the most important objections to 
cross-country analyses raised in the recent literature (e.g., Durlauf et.al., 2005).  
Empirically measuring the strength of the effect of fiscal mechanisms on growth 
has been the object of many studies. A weakness of this literature has been the general 
lack of a solid conceptual framework that would establish a clear taxonomy of 
expenditures to generically distinguish pro-growth spending patterns from the rest. This 
conceptual weakness is probably a reason for the non-robust findings across the 
literature.  Barro (1991), and Levine and Renelt (1992), for example, find that 
government spending has a negative effect on growth, while Ram (1986) finds a 
                                                     
10 But there are exceptions. Human capital is, at times, allocated towards garnering benefits that are 
social.  However, the relationship between rent-seeking and rents for social goods might even be 
negative.  When government social spending is low, more human capital might be allocated towards 
pressuring government to increase such spending (protesting, petitioning, addressing community needs 
not remedied by the government, etc).    
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positive correlation. Still others find that there is no correlation between both variables 
(Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). More recent analyses have shifted 
the attention to the composition of government expenditures (Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993; Islam, 1995; Devarajan et al., 1996). However, these studies have not yielded 
more definitive results than those that use aggregate spending.11 
We distinguish pro-market expenditures (PME) that alleviate the effects of 
market failure from market-restricting expenditures (RME) that do nothing to alleviate 
market failures and may instead exacerbate them. PME thus include social subsidies to 
households (education, health, and a variety of social protection programs), 
expenditures on knowledge creation and diffusion, as well as on pure public goods. 
RME include most non-social subsidies, such as commodity market subsidies, energy 
subsidies, credit subsidies and grants to corporations, loan guarantees, and bailouts of 
failed private financial institutions, among many others12. We empirically show that the 
quantitative effect of shifting the composition of fiscal spending from RME to PME on 
economic growth is dramatic. We also perform more disaggregated empirical 
estimations, by splitting PME into government social spending and spending in non-
                                                     
11 In general the empirical literature on the returns to public services is highly debated. Aschauer (1989) 
concludes that public capital is highly productive and attributes the decline in productivity in the USA to 
the decline in new public capital. However, some cast doubt on Aschauer’s findings, arguing that the 
results are not robust and are highly overestimated (Aaron, 1990). Others agree that the public investment 
has, indeed, been productive (see Romp and De Haan, 2007, for a survey). However, new investment is 
unlikely to match historical productivity levels. In general, as shown by the survey of Romp and De Haan 
(2007), the estimated elasticity of government investment is highly variable, suggesting time effects 
and/or highly non-linear relationships. 
12 An illustration of the magnitude of RME is provided by the following examples: Worldwide farm 
subsidies reached $500 billion in 2001, 1.5% of the world GDP or 4.5% of total government revenues 
(Anderson et. al., 2006).  Governments are estimated to spend in the range of 1 to 5% of annual GDP on 
fuel subsidies, tax exemptions and related subsidies mostly benefiting large firms (Coady et. al., 2006). 
The direct cost to US taxpayers of the S&L financial crises of the late 1980s has been estimated at $150 
billion mostly spent over the period 1989-92 or about 4% of the total federal spending in each year 
(Curry and Shibut, 2000).  
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social public goods and decomposing their effects on growth between a direct output 
effect and an investment effect, showing that most of the positive effect of PME on 
growth can indeed be attributed to the effect of spending on social goods. 
The theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship between 
government spending composition and economic growth is important especially given 
the influence of economic crises on both the size and composition of government 
expenditures.  In times of economic crises, many governments use fiscal spending as a 
mechanism to stimulate the economy. Fiscal stimulus not only entails more or less 
temporary surges in fiscal spending but also significant revisions of governments 
priorities. Periods of crisis, when massive fiscal spending expansion can be easily 
justified, are propitious opportunities to change relative spending priorities without 
having to reduce politically sensitive programs (Higgs, 1987). While the increased 
government spending may turn out to be temporary, the changes in the composition of 
fiscal spending often become permanent. 13 In view of this, one may expect that the 
2008-2009 financial crisis may cause significant changes in the structure of government 
spending composition although the direction of change is unclear. Calls for austerity 
measures, particularly cuts in social expenditures in Europe and the US, further 
underline the importance of the present study. 
 
                                                     
13 For example the US government used the unprecedented fiscal spending expansion designed to deal 
with the Great Depression to dramatically increase social protection and welfare programs as well as 
education and other related programs resulting in an increase in the share of government spending on 
social programs from 2.48% in 1929 to 10.72% in 1940. In Korea, fiscal spending in social security and 
welfare increased from 7.8% of the total government expenditures in years prior to the 1997-98 Asia 
crisis to 13.5% by 2003-2005, and in Thailand from less than 4% to almost 9% in 2003-05 (Asian 




2. Conceptual Model and the Central Hypothesis 
 
The model describes the responses of firms and households to fiscal policy and the 
subsequent impact on economic growth under imperfect credit markets. We first show 
the optimal human capital investment choice by credit-constrained and unconstrained 
households, and the resulting implications for aggregate supply of human capital in the 
economy. We then present the firm’s maximization problem and the ensuing optimal 
allocation of resources for constrained and unconstrained firms towards production and 
rent- seeking activities, and the implications for aggregate factor demand in the 
economy. Finally, we delineate the equilibrium for factor markets, and the implications 
for output and economic growth for the economy.  
The analysis assumes two types of market failures: (i) Asymmetric information 
and moral hazard, which foster an environment where collateral requirements are 
essential to access credit, and transaction costs in credit markets, which introduce a 
wedge between lending and borrowing rates (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Hayashi, 1985)14. (ii) Human capital spillovers in the generation and 
adoption of knowledge (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000; Acemoglu, 1996; Murphy et. al., 
1991).  
                                                     
14Recent empirical literature has shown that credit market failure is pervasive in both poor countries 




2.1 Assumptions.  
 
We assume that workers or households invest in human capital and firms invest in 
physical capital. Credit rationing affects only some of the households and firms 
(presumably the least wealthy), while others can borrow freely in domestic or even 
international capital markets (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Whited, 1992). To sharpen the 
analysis, we define constrained firms and households as those with net wealth below a 
certain critical level, which impedes access to the formal capital markets.  
Additional assumptions are: (A.1) The economy is open to international capital 
markets implying that a segment of firms and households (i.e., the financially 
“unconstrained” firms and households) face a fixed price for capital, while international 
mobility of human capital is restricted meaning that its level is endogenous to the 
economy.15 (A.2) Firms produce a single output using physical capital and various 
types of labor skills, using a constant-returns-to-scale production function, and are price 
takers in input and output markets. The production technology is weakly separable in 
physical capital and the various types of labor skills. (A.3) The various labor skills are 
perfect substitutes for each other in the firms’ production function up to a scale factor. 
One hour of a high-skilled worker is equivalent to more than one hour of work of a 
lower skilled worker. (A.4) Workers invest financial resources to enhance their human 
capital through a production function, which is subject to decreasing marginal returns 
                                                     
15 International labor mobility is not in reality fully restricted as we assume here as shown by the 
significant migration flows occurring in certain contexts. However, the qualitative analysis is still valid 
as long as international labor flows are affected by a degree of restrictions while financial and physical 
capital flows freely in and out of the country.       
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due to the existence of a fixed factor (workers’ innate ability). (A.5) Due to credit 
transaction costs, the banks’ lending interest rate is higher than their borrowing rate.   
Assumption A.1 is consistent with the increasing integration of world capital 
markets that have taken place over the last three decades and with the permanence of 
severe restrictions to international labor migration. A.2 is fairly standard in the 
literature. Assumption A.3 is less so, but is made to reduce the dimension of the human 
capital market effectively to just one market. This assumption, in combination with 
A.2, allows for the existence of a composite wage rate and a human capital aggregator 
function in the firms’ production function. Assumption A.4 is also common in the 
literature (Galor, 2000). Assumption A.5 as we shall see ensures that credit-constrained 
firms relying on their own financial capital are not entirely displaced by unconstrained 
firms.  
2.2 Human capital investment 
 
Each worker or household has one unit of human capital. By investing h dollars in 
period 0, she can enhance her human capital by a function ( )hψ  and thus her total 
human capital in period 1 is 1+ ( )hψ . The function ( )hψ is increasing and, by 
assumption (A4), strictly concave in h . We assume that (0) 0ψ = . Each worker 
maximizes her utility over two periods. In period 0 we assume without loss of 
generality that the worker earns a given wage rate, 0w , and has a fixed level of wealth, 
s0. For a worker that invests in human capital in period 0, her wage in period 1 
is 1 0(1 ( ))w h wψ= + . 
124 
 
Financially-unconstrained workers can borrow unlimitedly at a fixed lending 
rate, fr . Constrained workers cannot borrow and consequently have to finance their 
human capital investment (and consumption) out of their own wealth. Whether or not a 
worker is financially constrained depends on her initial level of wealth. The minimum 
wealth level to access credit markets is s and hence only workers with 0 0w s s+ ≥ are 
able to borrow freely at the rate fr ,while all other workers cannot borrow and 
consequently are financially-constrained.  
The following lemma follows from the above setting: 
Lemma 1. (i) Human capital investment by financially-constrained workers in 
period 0 ( )ch is lower than that of unconstrained workers ( uh ) and, consequently, 
human capital and the wage of unconstrained workers in period 1 is higher than that of 
constrained workers, that is, ( ) ( )u ch hψ ψ> , which implies that 1 1
u cw w> . (ii)  While the 
level of human capital investment by financially-unconstrained workers is unaffected by 
their initial wealth, human capital investment by financially-constrained workers is 
increasing in their wealth level. 
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Consider the effect of an exogenous increase in the level of wealth of a worker 
in period 0: The additional wealth reduces the internal marginal cost of capital for the 
financially-constrained worker and hence the worker will spend part of the additional 
wealth in financing more investment in human capital and part of it to increase 
consumption. By contrast, for financially-unconstrained workers, their increased wealth 
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affects neither their marginal (market) cost of capital nor the rate of return to human 
capital. Hence, they do not change their investment level and instead devote their entire 
additional wealth to consumption.        
Using assumption A.4 it follows that for a financially-constrained worker c , the 
level of human capital in period 1 is 1+ψ( 0 0( , )
c ch s w ), where 0
cs  is the wealth of worker 
c in period 0 while the unconstrained worker u ,  has human capital equal to 
1+ψ( 0( , )
u fh r w ). Suppose there are a fixed number of workers equal to N, of which 
0C have levels of wealth below the critical level ( s ) in period 0 and 0N C− have wealth 
levels sufficient to allow full access to the credit market. Without loss of generality we 
can order workers according to their wealth level from the poorest to the richest. Then 
the economy’s total supply of human capital in period 1 is 
(1)                               
01 2
0 0 0 0 0( , ,......, ; , )





















Thus, the aggregate supply of human capital in period 1 is a function of the wealth 
levels, the wage rate, and number of financially-constrained workers in period 0. The 
fact that 0 0 0( , ) ( , )
c c u fh s w h r w<  for all 0
cs s< implies that 1 20 0 0 0 0( , ,......, ; , )
S CL s s s C w is 
decreasing in 0C , and also 0/ 0
ch s∂ ∂ >  means that sL is increasing in 0
cs  ( for 
all 01,2,.....,c C= ). 
Consider a lump-sum transfer in period 0 to each financially-constrained worker 
equal to m . From (1) it follows that the transfer has two effects on sL : ( i ) an intra-
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marginal effect caused by increasing human capital of workers that remain financially 
constrained after the transfer, and ( ii ) a discrete effect on workers whose level of initial 
wealth is such that the transfer allows them to “jump” into the unconstrained regime, 








L s s m
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ >0 while the jump effect is equal to 0 0( / )( / )sL C C m∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , which 
is also positive because 0 /C m∂ ∂ <0. Thus, the potency of subsidies to financially-
constrained workers in raising their human capital can be quite large. For those workers 
that are near the border of the financial regime, even a small lump-sum subsidy can 
have a dramatic effect on investments in human capital by propelling them into an 
unconstrained financial regime. The following lemma summarizes the implications of 
the previous analysis. 
Lemma 2. (i) Workers facing binding credit constraints invest sub-optimally in human 
capital, which cannot be compensated by increased human capital investments by 
workers that are unaffected by credit constraints. (ii) Aggregate supply of human 
capital, SL , is reduced by the existence of credit constraints affecting a subset of 
workers; (iii) Subsidies to workers in period 0 increase the aggregate supply of human 
capital in period 1 if at least some of them are financially constrained, possibly 
inducing an investment jump effect among a subset of workers. 
 




First consider financially-unconstrained firms. We assume that they use human capital 
and physical capital to produce new value (output) and for rent-seeking activities 
necessary to grab part of the (non-social) subsidies that the government makes available 
to firms.  Consider a firm’s production function in period 1. By assumptions A.2 and 
A.3 we can write firm j’s production function as                                    
                                             jy = ( , )j jaf k l , 
where jy denotes firm j’s output, jk is the firm’s physical capital, and 
0





= +∑  is the firm’s total human capital used in producing output. jl  is 
an increasing and homogenous of degree one function of the 1n +   labor skills used by 
the firm in the production of jy (all variables correspond to period 1; we omit the 
subscripts indicating time period). Assumptions A.2 and A.3 also imply that the 
function f ( ) is homogenous of degree one in jk and jl . Total factor productivity, a , is 
taken as given by firms. 
 The rent-capturing function is assumed to be a function of the firm lobbying 
efforts using physical capital ( Mjk ) and human capital (
M
jl ). In addition, the 
effectiveness of such effort depends on the availability of non-social government 
subsidies to be allocated to firms ( M ).  Thus, we assume that the (gross) rent-capturing 
function of firm j  is, 
                                            ( , ; )M Mj j jR R k l M=    
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This function is assumed to be increasing, concave and linearly homogenous in Mjk , 
M
jl and M . Thus, firms need to divert factors of production for lobbying in order to 
share part of the rents made available by the government. The assumption of linearly 
homogeneity of the function ( , ; )M Mj jR k l M implies, as we show below, that the chosen 
levels of Mjk  and 
M
jl are proportional to M and therefore that a doubling of M , for 
example, would result in a doubling of the factors used in lobbying and hence in a 
doubling of gross rents captured by firm j . Profit maximization of the financially 
unconstrained firm including both production and rent-grabbing activities is, 
        
, , ,
max { ( , ) ( , ; ) ( ) ( )}
M M
j j j j
M M f M M
j j j j j j j j
k l k l
af k l R k l M r k k w l lπ ≡ + − + − + , 
where fr is the exogenous cost of capital given by international capital markets and w is 
the composite  wage of the human capital composite factor.  
Financially-constrained firms are assumed to solve a similar problem except 
that they are unable to lobby, which means that they do not share the rents. 16 That is, 
constrained firms merely maximize profits emanating from their productive activities.     
Lemma 3. (i) The equilibrium human capital-to-physical capital ratio employed in 
productive activities is identical for financially-unconstrained and constrained firms, 
( / ) ( / )E Ec c j jl l kχ =  , where cχ is the wealth of financially-constrained firms and cl is 
human capital employed by financially-constrained firms.  (ii) The equilibrium human 
capital-to-physical capital ratio is ( / ) ( / )E fj jl k r aφ=  where φ is a strictly increasing 
                                                     
16 The assumption that financially-constrained firms are unable to lobby is justified by the fact that they 
are small and by definition face severe capital limitations.    
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function and is fixed for given levels of ( / )fr a . (iii) The ratio of lobbying human 
capital to government non-social subsidies, /Mjl M , and lobbying physical capital to 
government non-social subsidies, /Mjk M , are also fixed as determined by 
/ ( , )M L E fjl M w rζ=  and / ( , )
M K E f
jk M w rζ=   respectively, where 
Lζ ( Kζ ) are  
decreasing (increasing) in Ew  and increasing (decreasing) in fr and 
( , / )E E fw w a r a= is increasing in a and decreasing in fr .  
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Lemma 3 provides two seemingly paradoxical results that need to be 
heuristically explained. The first one is the result that the human capital-to-physical 
capital ratios are identical for unconstrained and constrained firms. That is, the 
condition 1( / )
f
j jaf l k r= is valid not only for financially unconstrained firms but also 
for constrained firms; suppose constrained firms’ marginal product of physical capital 
is higher than the price of capital as a consequence of their low levels of owned capital, 
which means that / /j j j jl l kχ > . This must imply that the marginal product of labor in 
the constrained firms is lower than the wage rate. Hence employment by constrained 
firms must fall, which causes the /j jl χ ratio to fall until the human capital-to-physical 
ratio becomes equal to that of the unconstrained firms. Thus, the mechanism to reach 
this condition is through adjusting labor allocation between constrained and 
unconstrained firms, not capital. For financially-constrained firms the condition 
1( / )
f
c caf l rχ = holds by making c jl l< . 
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The second result needing an intuitive explanation is why the unique human 
capital – physical capital ratio is fixed. From the first order conditions for the 
unconstrained firms’ maximization problem: 2 ( / )j jaf l k w=  and 1( / )
f
j jaf l k r=
17. By 
constant returns to scale, the only endogenous choice variable to the firm is /j jl k . 
Given that fr is exogenously given, the above two conditions cannot in principle hold 
simultaneously unless the wage rate adjusts to a unique equilibrium level, Ew , that is 
consistent with profit maximization of all financially-unconstrained firms.  Competitive 
profit maximizing equilibrium implies exactly this: If Ew w> , profits are negative, 
which cause firms to exit leading to lower demand for human capital and hence a fall of 
the wage rate until it reaches Ew . The opposite happens if Ew w< . Thus, competitive 
equilibrium implies that the first order conditions with regards to human capital and 
physical capital solve for unique equilibrium levels of the human capital/physical 
capital ratio, ( / )Ej jl k , and wage rate, 
Ew .  
Factor market equilibrium 
Using lemma 3 we obtain the aggregate demand for human capital from financially 
unconstrained and constrained firms in period 1,  
                                                     
17 Note that 2 ( / )j jaf l k w=  applies to the human capital composite used by the firm, jl , but  using the 
definition of 
0





= +∑ we have that for each of the specific labor types the condition 
is 2 ( / )((1 ( ))
n n
j jaf l k h wψ+ = . That is, given assumption (A.3) we can define the wage for workers 
of skill n as /(1 ( ))n n nw w hψ≡ + for all 1,.....,n n= . 
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where U and C  are the number of financially-unconstrained and constrained firms, 
respectively. Thus, we can express the economy’s total demand for human capital as, 











∑ ∑ is the aggregate level of physical capital of financially-








≡ ∑ is the total human capital used in rent seeking activities. We note that given 
that the economy is assumed to be fully integrated into international capital markets, 
U is variable; if the domestic profitability of physical capital increases then 
U increases.  
Using (1) and (3) it follows that market clearing condition for human capital 
implies, 
            (4)                       01 20 0 0 0 0( , ,......, ; , ) ( ( , / ), )
CS M E fL s s s C w L w a r a M− = ( / )fr a Kφ . 
The left-hand- side of (4) denotes the total supply of human capital in period 1 as given 
by (1) minus the human capital employed in rent-seeking activities, and the right-hand-
side is the demand for human capital for productive activities in period 1. As shown in 
Section 2.2, 01 20 0 0, ,....,
Cs s s  and 0C are the levels of wealth of the financially-constrained 
workers and the total number of constrained workers in period 0, respectively. Hence 
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sL is predetermined by the investments in human capital made in the earlier periods and 
so is the level of total factor productivity, which depends among other things on the 
past availability of human capital for production (see below for more about the 
determinants of productivity). Also, fr is given by international capital markets and is 
thus independent of the level of domestic physical capital investment. Hence, the 
human capital market clearing condition (4) can be attained when aggregate physical 
capital reaches a unique equilibrium level, EK .18 Equation (4) solves 
for ( , ; )E S M fK L L a r= Ω − , where the function ( , ; )S M fL L a rΩ − is increasing in 
SL and a , and decreasing in fr and ML . 
Aggregate output 
Given constant returns to scale in production, firm j ’s production technology can be 
written as jy = (1, / )j j jaf l k k . From lemma 3(ii) we have that jy = (1, ( / ))
f
jaf r a kφ . 
Similarly, using lemma 3(i), the production technology of the constrained firms can be 
written as (1, ( / ))fc cy af r a kφ= . Thus the equilibrium aggregate output of the economy 
is,  
 (5)                                  
1 1





Y y y af r a Kφ
= =
≡ + =∑ ∑ . 
                                                     
18 This means that the endogenous aggregate level of investment allows for the equalization of the 
aggregate human capital supply and demand.  At w = Ew the whole wage structure is determined in 
accordance with (1 ( ))n n Ew h wψ= + for all 1,...,n n= . At these wages equilibrium between supply 
and demand for each skill also occurs due to the assumption that labor skills are perfect substitutes in 
production. Suppose that this is not the case and that instead there is excess supply of workers of a 
particular skill, n . This causes nw to become below the equilibrium one, (1+ ( )nhψ ) Ew , which, in 
turn, induces firms to instantaneously substitute among skills increasing their demand for workers with 
skill n until the equilibrium wage rate is reestablished. Thus, due to the perfect substitution assumption, 
the demand for skills is completely flexible in adjusting to the supply of skills.      
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Equation (5) shows that aggregate output is impervious to credit constraints affecting 
firms. Also,Y in (5) does not appear to be directly affected by aggregate effective 
human capital, S ML L− , which may seem paradoxical. However, given ( / )fr aφ there 
is a fixed relationship between EK and ( )S ML L−  (by (4) ( ) / ( / )S M E fL L K r aφ− = ). 
Hence, EK adapts to the existing supply of the effective human capital, ( )S ML L− , so 
that ( ) /S M EL L K− ratio is set equal to φ . Thus, we could equivalently write (5) in 
terms of ( )S ML L− instead of EK . EK can thus be regarded as an index for all the 
factors used in production. The following lemma and its policy corollary summarize the 
most important results of this section. 
Lemma 4. (i) Credit market imperfections affecting domestic firms are of no 
consequence for the level of aggregate physical capital used in production. Aggregate 
physical capital is neither affected by the number of financially-constrained firms nor 
their levels of investment and it is instead determined by conditions prevailing in the 
human capital market as depicted by Equation (4).(ii) Credit market imperfections 
affecting firms are of no consequence for the level of aggregate output of the economy. 











∑ ∑ . Suppose that financial constraints tighten so that the 
minimum wealth level to access credit markets increase causing C to increase and U to 
fall concomitantly (firms that were financially-unconstrained become constrained). The 
effect of this is to temporarily reduce the aggregate productive physical capital 
making EK K< thus reducing the demand for human capital. Consequently according to 
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(4) a temporary excess supply of human capital emerges, which causes an incipient 
reduction of the wage rate which, in turn, renders physical capital temporarily more 
profitable thus inducing firms to enter the economy. That is, U  increases until the 
disequilibrium in the human capital market is completely erased at EK K= . Hence the 
new equilibrium is different from the previous one only in the composition of firms, a 
higher number of financially-constrained firms each investing less and a larger number 
of unconstrained firms that exactly compensate for the fall in physical capital among 
constrained firms.  This shows part ( i ). Part ( ii ) follows directly from equation (5). ⊗  
Corollary 4.1. Subsidies to firms do not increase the economy’s aggregate productive 
physical capital, aggregate output and the rate of growth of total factor productivity as 
long as the market borrowing interest rate ( fr ) remains unchanged and continues to 
dictate the marginal cost of capital.  
2.4 Productivity growth, human capital and rent seeking 
 
The solution to the equations (4) and (5) should be interpreted as a temporary 
equilibrium that depends on the total factor productivity, a .We now turn to the 
dynamics of productivity. The aggregate stock of human capital determines the size of 
the pool of workers with the sufficient cognitive skills necessary to create new ideas 
(Acemoglu, 1996). Furthermore, the diversion of human capital from productive 
activities to unproductive rent-seeking activities reduces the pool of human capital 
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engaged in the generation of new productive ideas, and therefore has a negative effect 
on the growth of productivity (Murphy et. al., 1991) 19.  
The creation and adaptation of new ideas requires that a large number of 
workers be able to continuously participate and interact among each other in such intent 
(Acemoglu, 1996). Human capital devoted to productive activities causes spillovers or 
externalities that promote total factor productivity, that is, productivity is increasing 
in S ML L− .  Productivity growth, however, is subject to a maximum growth rate, Δ , 
which is  given by the existing rate of expansion of the world technology-scientific 
frontier. We can then write total factor productivity function in period t  as,  
       
1
1
( ) ( )
( )
         
                        
S M S M
t t t t t
t S M
t t t
a L L if L L
a
a if L L
−
−
⎧ + Δ − Δ − < Δ
= ⎨
+ Δ Δ − ≥ Δ⎩
 
Where we assume that Δ  is an increasing and strictly concave function of S Mt tL L− , 
and 0S Mt tL L− > ↔ ( ) 0
S M
t tL LΔ − > .  
Even if ( )s ML L−  is fixed there will exist a constant flow of productive new 
ideas, which may allow for the increase of the total factor productivity of the economy 
over time as long as the  economy’s productivity growth is below the maximum 
technology frontier. For economies where productivity is already growing at the 
technology frontier growth rate, productivity growth rate may not be increased by 
further investment in human capital. That is, the rate of productivity growth is non-
                                                     
19 Lobbying attracts significant resources in the United States. In a summary of various literatures on 
lobbying, McGrath (2006) reports that the Washington component of lobbying-connected activities 
employs at least 100,000 people, most of them highly educated (Nownes, 2006).  A survey of Oregon 




increasing in productive human capital for 1( )S Mt tL L
−− ≥ Δ Δ . Presumably, there is no 
country or only very few of them that fully exploit the technology frontier as a source 
of productivity growth. This means that the majority of the countries, especially those 
that face the most unabated human capital market imperfections, may not exploit the 
full potential of the technological frontier growth. Hence, at least for the vast majority 
of the countries we can assume that total factor productivity growth is increasing in 
their respective stocks of human capital used in production. Thus, a productivity growth 
function in continuous form can be written as,        
(6)                          / ( ; )a S M aa a g L L Z= − , 
where aZ denotes other factors that may affect productivity growth and the function ag  
is increasing in S ML L− (we henceforth omit time subscripts).  
The following lemma summarizes these ideas. 
Lemma 5. (i) Credit rationing affecting households and rent-seeking activities reduce 
the stock of human capital engaged in creating productive new ideas. (ii) For countries 
exhibiting productivity growth rate below the world technological frontier one, Δ , the 
rate of productivity growth is increasing in productive human capital and, hence, 
unmitigated credit rationing affecting households as well as rent seeking reduce the 
rate of growth of total factor productivity.⊗      
 




The following two propositions summarize the key implications of the lemmas 1 to 5 
for fiscal policies:          
 Proposition 1. In economies affected by credit-rationing, subsidies to households or 
workers increase the aggregate supply of human capital and enhance the human 
creativity pool, which in turn, may cause a faster rate of productivity growth, and also 
more investment in physical capital.  All this leads to a faster rate of economic growth.  
Proposition 2. Subsidies to firms (with the possible exception of R&D subsidies) do not 
increase aggregate investment in physical capital, cause little spillovers into the 
household sector to relieve its financial constraints, and by contributing to divert more 
of the scarce stock of human capital to rent-seeking activities, reduce the rate of growth 
of total factor productivity and hence economic growth.  
 
2.6 Towards an empirical specification of the model 
 
To link the theoretical model with an empirically estimable one we need to 
assume a functional form for the production function. A common practice in growth 
models has been to assume a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, modern 
empirical studies have consistently rejected the assumption of a unitary elasticity of 
substitution implied by the Cobb-Douglas function and instead have shown that the 
elasticity of substitution between physical capital and human capital is far lower than 1 
(Pessoa et.al., 2005; Antras, 2004; Jalava, 2006; Claro, 2003).  We thus assume a CES 
production function with a less-than-one elasticity of substitution ( 1σ < ). Denote the 
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growth rate of per capita output as yg , the growth rate of productivity as ag , and the 
rate of growth of productive human capital as
S ML Lg − .  Also define 
frg , kg , 0sg , Cg , 
MLg  as the growth rates for the market interest rate, physical capital per capita, the 
wealth of the financially-constrained workers, the number of financially-constrained 
















. Lemma 6 constitutes the crucial bridge between the 
theoretical and empirical models: 
Lemma 6. With the assumption of a CES production with an elasticity of substitution 
less than one, we obtain a system of output growth (7) and physical capital growth (8) 
equations,  
(7)                                   (1 )
fy a k rg g g gσ σ= − + +  
(8)                                   ( )
S M fk L L a rg g g gσϖ−= + − . 
Proof. See Appendix I. 
The growth version of the left-hand-side of Equation (4), that is the growth rate of 
productive human capital, can be approximated as,  
(9)                                   01 2 3
S M MsL L C Lg g g gλ λ λ− = − −  
where 1λ , 2λ , and 3λ are positive parameters and the rest of the variables are defined in 
the text above. Finally, using a linear approximation for the equation of total factor 
productivity (equation (6)), 
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 (10)                         1 21 0 0 0 0 0 2( , ,......, ; , ) ( , , )
a S C M E f ag L s s s C w L w r M Zγ γ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ ;       
where aZ are factors other than SL  and ML that may affect productivity growth, 1γ and 
2γ are  positive parameters and 2γ is a fixed parameter. Equations (7) to (10) constitute 
the basic link between the theoretical model and the empirical econometric model 
derived below.                      
It might seem paradoxical that in (7) the effect of increases in the interest 
rate, fr , on the rate of growth may be positive. This is true for a given rate of growth of 
physical capital, reflecting the fact that an increase of fr  induces greater use of human 
capital. However, from (8) it is clear that the rate of growth of physical capital is 
decreasing in fr  and, moreover, using (8) in (7) we obtain the following reduced-form 
output growth equation,  
(11)                                         (1 ( 1)) ( 1)
S M fy a L L rg g g gσ ϖ σ ϖ−= + − + − −  
Thus, the net effect of 
frg on economic growth is negative equal to ( 1)σ ϖ− −  
(remember that 1ϖ > ).  Similarly, from the above equation it is clear that the net effect 
of the growth of total factor productivity on economic growth is greater than 1. This is 
the productivity-magnification effect: The rate of growth of total factor productivity 
exerts a greater than proportional effect on economic growth.           
  




Proposition 1 shows that total factor productivity, growth of physical and human 
capitals are all functions of the levels of government spending on social subsidies in 
period 0 ( 0PME ). The wealth levels of households or workers are increasing in 0PME , 
0 0/ 0
is PME∂ ∂ ≥  (for 1,....,i N= with a strict inequality for some i ), and the number of 
financially-constrained workers is decreasing in 0 ,PME  0 0/ 0C PME∂ ∂ < . Hence, from 
(1) given that 1 20 0 0 0 0( , ,......, ; , )
S CL s s s C w is increasing in 0
is  and decreasing in 0C , it 
follows that 0/ 0
SL PME∂ ∂ > . Moreover, Proposition 1 also predicts that the rate of 
growth of total factor productivity is increasing in S ML L− and hence is increasing in 
the lagged level of PME , 0/ 0
ag PME∂ ∂ > .  
The (negative) effect of government subsidies to firms (RME) on the rate of 
productivity growth is due to their links the variable M. Expenditures in non-social 
subsidies are used to build the necessary institutional and financial infrastructure to 
establish and maintain the system of channeling and allocating the benefits. Hence we 
may expect that M  is the result of past expenditures in RME. Since ML is increasing in 
M (see lemma 3(iii)) and M is increasing in RME it follows that 
0/ 0
ML RME∂ ∂ > ,which by Lemma 5 (and equation (6)) implies 0/ 0
ag RME∂ ∂ < .  
Thus we can write the rates of growth of total factor productivity, physical 
capital, human capital and the interest rate facing country i  at time t  as functions of the 
lagged spending patterns and other factors, 1 1( , ; )
a a
it it it itg PME RME Z− − , 
1 1( , ; )
k k
it it it itg PME RME Z− − , 1 1( , ; )
S ML L L
it it it itg PME RME Z
−
− − , and ( )
fr r







tZ  are other factors that may affect the growth of productivity, 
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physical capital, human capital, and interest rate, respectively.  Using equations (8) to 
(11) it follows that  
 (12)                           1 1( , ; ) (1 ) ( )
fy a a r r
it it it it it tg g PME RME Z g Zσ σ− −= + − +
k
itg  
 (13)                           1 1 1 1( , ; ) [ ( , ; ) ( )]
fk L L a a r r
it it it it it it it it it tg g PME RME Z g PME RME Z g Zβ− − − −= + −  
where 0β ϖσ= > . Propositions 1 and 2 lead to the following testable hypotheses:  
The Central Hypotheses: The functions aitg ,
k
itg  and 
L
itg are increasing in 1itPME − and 
decreasing in 1itRME − . Given (12) and (13) it follows that: (1) a reallocation of 
government spending from RME to PME promotes faster economic growth. (2) RME 
may reduce , ,a Lit itg g or even 
k
itg  and hence slowdown the rate of growth of the economy.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
We derive a reduced-form equation for per capita GDP growth from the key theoretical 
equation (7). We first estimate this model using panel country level data focusing 
mainly on the government variables, using highly parsimonious and eclectic 
specifications, which rely on fixed and country-specific time-varying coefficients to 
account for the other potential factors that may affect economic growth.  We then 




The approach is directed to at least partially mitigate some of the most serious 
objections to cross country panel analyses raised in the literature.  Durlauf et. al. (2005) 
has summarized these objections: (1) model uncertainty, which introduces significant 
ambiguity about the empirical specification, specifically the control variables included. 
This issue is particularly serious to the extent that the estimates of the parameters of 
interest may be affected by changes in the control variables used.  (2) Parameter 
heterogeneity caused by the fact that cross country regressions often use data from 
countries that are at very different stages of development, which may have different 
production functions. (3) Biased estimates due to reverse causality and the omission of 
variables that may be correlated with the statistical error term.      
 To deal with (1) we use two approaches: A model that allows us to control for 
an unspecified number of factors relying on fixed and time-varying country-specific 
effects, which we call Variable Country Effects (TVC) method. In addition, we expand 
the empirical specification to sequentially introduce a large number of measured control 
sets using a procedure first proposed by Altonji (2005). We consider (2) by using 
several sub-samples comprising of countries that are at similar stages of development to 
see whether the narrowing of the samples in several directions cause the basic results of 
interest to change. With respect to (3), we use a lagged structure of the explanatory 
variables that is in fact predicted by the theoretical model, which in the context of the 
TVC method should greatly reduce the risks of inconsistent estimates associated with 
the combination of reverse causality and omitted variables.        




To estimate the output growth equation (12) we normalize the variables of interest as 
follows: 1itPME − is divided by total government expenditures, 
defining 1 1 1/it it itpme PME G− − −≡ ; instead of using 1itRME −  as a separate variable we use 
total government spending (excluding public investment) normalized by GDP using the 
variable 1 1 1/it it itq G GDP− − −≡ . Also we follow the common practice of approximating 
physical capital growth by total investments (including private and public) in physical 
capital normalized by GDP using the variable /it it itinv INV GDP≡ . These are merely 
convenient normalizations that permit a more precise estimation and allows for a direct 
assessment of the government spending composition effect. Furthermore, these 
normalizations make the newly defined variables unit free thus mitigating measurement 
problems originated in currency fluctuations and inflation across countries and over 
time. Finally, we proxy the (largely unknown) control variables aitZ  with country-
idiosyncratic fixed and time-varying effects while we use common-to-all-country time 
effects in lieu of rtZ in (12)   
Using the above normalizations we can write the rate of growth of per capita 
GDP from (12) as,  
(14)                            1 1 2 1 3
y
it it it it it t itg pme q invη η η ν τ μ− −= + + + + +      
where itν is a function that encapsulates the country-specific fixed and time-varying 
effects and tτ  are the common-to-all-countries time effects. itμ is the stochastic 
disturbance assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a zero mean and 
fixed variance; 1 2,η η and 3η are fixed parameters. Since we use itinv instead of growth 
144 
 
of per capita physical capital, 3η is not equal to 1 as suggested by equation (7). Since 
( / )kg inv GDP K δ= −  (where δ =rate of physical capital depreciation) it follows 
that 3 ( / )
AGDP Kη ≈ , where ( / )AGDP K is the average GDP/K ratio in the sample. 
Since the physical capital stock values are typically much larger than annual levels of 
GDP (Hamilton, 2005), it is expected that 3η <1.  




itZ , respectively is recognition of our ignorance about the many other factors 
that are likely to affect international capital markets and domestic productivity growth. 
This is a drastic departure from the standard approach where authors often guess what 
such factors may be on the basis of specific conceptual models as well as on the 
availability of data. However, we do check the robustness of our results by combining 
this approach by adding a large number of specific control sets.       
We need to specify the nature of the country-idiosyncratic time-varying effect 
function, itν . The TVC approach assumes that itν  is a function, which can be 
approximated by a (T-2)th order (country specific) polynomial function of time where 
its parameters  are allowed to take different values for each country. Typically potential 
important control variables, for example microeconomic policies, political institutions, 
property rights and so forth, follow certain patterns, which tend to change over time 
non-linearly, not always monotonically, and in a country-idiosyncratic manner, but 
their changes may exhibit some degree of systematic correlation with time. Thus, such 
omitted control variables may be adequately captured by polynomial functions of time 
that are sufficiently flexible. We postulate the following polynomial function, 
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(15)  2 3 20 1 2 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ........ ( )
T
it i i i i T i itb b trnd b trnd b trnd b trnd eν
−
−= + + + + + +  
Where 0ib , 1 2 3, ,i i ib b b ,….. 2,T ib − are fixed coefficients that are allowed to be different for 
each country, and trnd  is a time trend variable. The coefficients 0ib correspond to the 
fixed country effects and the remaining coefficients capture the country-idiosyncratic 
time-varying effects. 
Substituting (15) into (14) we obtain the estimating equation with new 
disturbance term it it iteμ μ= + . We assume the polynomial in equation (15) is an exact 
approximation of itν , and thus the residual of the polynomial approximation, ite , is 
assumed to be random and independent of time, an assumption that is empirically 
tested. If this assumption is not rejected then the TVC model would be able to control 
for unobserved time-varying country-specific variables thus mitigating possible biases 
to the coefficients of interest that would arise if the unknown control variables are 
correlated with the explanatory variables considered, a perennial problem of cross 
country analyses (Acemoglu et. al. 2001; Bose et. al. 2007).20   
One could fully control for the time-varying country-specific effects (i.e., all the 
itv effects) by using the complete matrix of country-year dummies but of course this 
would leave no degrees of freedom to estimate the effect of any other variable. It is 
easy to see that estimating a ( 1)thT − order polynomial function of time for each country 
                                                     
20 One concern might be that the TVC imposes a continuous rather than discrete control for time-varying 
effects. However, while the use of dummy variables in the standard approach to control for fixed country 
effects can be regarded as a discrete approximation, the effect of the effects of observed variables are 
indeed assumed to be continuous in most standard analyses. So the assumption of continuous unobserved 
effects is a natural extension of the standard regression analysis. Moreover, as we show below the TVC 
yields the discrete fixed effect model as a special case.      
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would be equivalent to estimating the complete matrix of country-year dummies. 
However, if we assume that the unobserved effects are not completely time-anarchic, a 
(T-2)th polynomial may be sufficiently flexible to capture these patterns while still 
permitting the estimation of the effects of observed variables. Thus, if ite  and hence itμ , 
is time independent, then the (T-2)th polynomial estimation may be sufficient to 
uncover the effects of the omitted variables and thus mitigate time-varying country-
idiosyncratic omitted variable biases.  
  The TVC is a generalization of the standard fixed country effects model (FE) 
so often used in growth regressions (for example, Fölster and Henrekson, 2001, and 
Afonso and Furceri, 2010). The fixed country effects correspond to the 0ib coefficients 
in (15) and thus FE can be regarded as a special case of TVC where (15) is restricted by 
imposing that all coefficients other than the country constants be zero. Since the FE 
model is nested in the TVC model we can test the validity of the FE model 
parametrically by imposing the following restrictions: 1 2 2.... 0i i T ib b b −= = = = for all 
}{1, 2,...,i I∈ .21 
Investment in physical capital  
Given that in the growth equation we control for the level of investment, to get the full 
effect of the government spending variables we need to also estimate an investment 
equation.  We use equation (13) arising from the theoretical model to postulate the 
                                                     
21 Similarly the Random Effects (RE) specification could also be tested if we allow for 
a random instead of deterministic intercept to the itν function. 
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following investment equation using the same normalizations for the government 
spending variables as those used in the per capita GDP growth equation, 
(16)                        1 1 2 1 3 1
y
it it it it t it itinv pme q g τ ν ε− − −= Γ + Γ + Γ + + +  
where 1 2 3, ,Γ Γ Γ are fixed parameters. Consistent with the theoretical analysis, 
investment is determined by the lagged government spending variables. In addition we 
postulate that investments are also determined by past rate of economic growth (Garcia-
Belenger and Santos, 2011). We use the same strategy to control for other unspecified 
factors using country-idiosyncratic time-varying functions ( itν ) also specified as 
polynomial functions of time as in (15), as well as common-to-all-countries time effects 
(τ ).  
 To gain efficiency we estimate the investment and growth equations jointly 
using a Seemingly Unrelated (SUR) estimator. We thus compute the direct or 
productivity effect and the indirect or investment effect of PME  and RME  on 
economic growth.  
 
Further remarks about the empirical specification 
The fact that we use lagged values for the two government spending variables is 
theoretically justified and also presents some advantages for the estimation by 
mitigating potential biases due to reverse causality. But of course if omitted variables 
are correlated with the lagged government expenditure variables the coefficient 
estimates may still be inconsistent. However, the fact that the TVC specification 
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controls for time-varying omitted variables, implies that it may mitigate the potential 
inconsistencies of the estimated coefficients of interest.   
 A pertinent issue is government spending efficiency. In this study we focus on 
efficiency of government spending associated with its allocation of expenditures – the 
effects of a reallocation from RME to PME spending is hypothesized to increase 
government spending efficiency. The direct independent efficiency of each spending 
category (PME or RME) is an issue, which we do not address here; we assume that 
both types of spending are equally inefficient. This assumption is partially justified by 
the fact that a priori there are no obvious reasons to presume that spending efficiency of 
each category may be different.  
 
Testing the predictions from the theoretical model 
The hypotheses postulated by the theoretical model are valid if the coefficient of the 
share of PME in total expenditures, 1η  in (14), is positive and statistically significant 
and if the coefficient of the share of total government spending on GDP, 2η in (14), is 
non positive. If these conditions are met then we can conclude that the effects of PME  
through total factor productivity is positive while the effect of RME  is negative as 
predicted by the theoretical analysis. In addition, the theoretical model predicts 
that 30 1η< < . These are the direct effects controlling for physical capital investments. 
 The theoretical analysis also predicts that the rate of growth of physical capital 
represented by the investment/GDP ratio, is positively affected by PME due to its 
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positive effect on total factor productivity, which in turn increases the rate of return to 
physical capital. RME is predicted to exert a negative effect on investment in physical 
capital because RME  induces a diversion of human capital from productive activities. 
Less human capital in production lowers the marginal product of physical capital and 
hence reduces investment. Thus, the theoretical analysis predicts that 1 0Γ > and 
2 0Γ ≤ in (16). Therefore, using the estimated parameters 1 2 3, ,η η η , 1,Γ and 2Γ  we can 
test the predictions of the theoretical model and compute the net growth effects of 
PME and RME .    
To gain more precise empirical insights on the central hypothesis regarding the 
effects of government social subsidies as a factor mitigating the negative effects of 
human capital market failure on growth, we disaggregate government spending further 
by considering social spending as a separate category. From the theoretical model one 
expects that the mechanism by which PME may contribute to increase economic 
growth is through the effect of social expenditures on human capital and, consequently, 
total factor productivity growth. Other public goods spending contained in the PME 
category (most prominently infrastructure) may affect economic growth mainly through 
its effect on aggregate investments.                       
             We use an unbalanced 5-year panel from 1980 to 2009 for 29 developed and 66 
developing countries (country list is at the bottom of Table A1). We choose to use 5-
year averages for each country because the effect of the composition of government 
expenditures on economic growth is not likely to be instantaneous and we consider that 
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five years is sufficient time to allow most of the effects of government spending to 




The lagged share of government expenditure on PME, is obtained from the Government 
Financial Statistics (GFS) complemented with national data sources. GFS data is 
widely used in the literature (Shelton 2007). PME include expenditures on health, 
education, housing, social protection, culture, environmental protection, and public 
order and safety. RME expenditures include all subsidies to firms (apart from R&D and 
environmental protection subsidies), agricultural subsidies, credit subsidies to firms and 
other non-social subsidies. Table A1 provides the data sources and definitions. 
Table A2 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions. 
The median of the share of PME spending in the sample is 54.3% of total government 
spending with a standard deviation of 15.3. Table A3 presents composition of PME and 
RME spending as well as trends over time.  About 82% of PME expenditure 
corresponds to social subsidies in the form of education, health care and social security. 
In general, there is a steady increase in PME spending over the sample period, mostly 
due to increases in social subsidies. RME expenditures account for about 44% of 






3.3.1 Single Equation Estimators of growth 
Table 1 presents the results for the various empirical methods considered in the 
previous section using the single equation specification for the rate of per capita GDP 
growth. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the estimates of the restricted versions of the 
model (14) using standard Two-Way Fixed (TWFE) and Two-Way Random effects 
(TWRE) (in column 1 we present the OLS estimates for comparison purposes). The 
robust standard errors of the coefficients are reported in brackets. 22 Columns 4 and 5 in 
Table 1 present the TVC-FE estimates as specified in Equation (14) and (15) using a 
second and third order approximations for the functions itν , respectively.
23 The TVC-
FE method  imply estimating up to 4 additional coefficients for each country that 
should control for fixed country effects as well as for time-varying effects all of which 
are allowed to be different for each country.24  
                                                     
22 Stock and Watson (2008) suggest that robust standard errors may be preferable to clustered standard 
errors under fixed-effects estimation when the number of countries is large and the number of 
observations per country is short as in our case. 
23 Most of the countries in the sample have 5 or less observations which limits the approximation of the 
itv functions to a third order as a maximum; that is, we estimate 4 coefficients for each country to 
approximate the itv function, a country-specific constant plus 3 coefficients associated with time up to 
the cubic level. For countries with 4, 3 and 2 observations we allow for second, first and a fixed country 
effect, respectively. There are a few countries that have 6 observations which may allow us to use a 
fourth order approximation for them. We provide the results with a 4th order approximations for these 
countries in tables B4 and B5 in the online Appendix: 
http://www.arec.umd.edu/People/Faculty/Lopez_Ramon/OnlineAppendix.pdf. 
24 Table B4 in the Online Appendix 
(http://www.arec.umd.edu/People/Faculty/Lopez_Ramon/OnlineAppendix.pdf) shows the results 
obtained using TVC-RE method, which assumes that the constant terms in the itν functions are random 
instead of deterministic.  
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The various models provide remarkably similar qualitative estimates for the 
effects of 1itpme − and 1itq − on the growth equation. All models show that lagged share of 
government expenditure on PME yields a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient at least at 5% level of significance. In addition, all estimates yield 
statistically insignificant coefficients for the effect of total government expenditure 
variable. The estimates for the effects of investment are positive and significant.  These 
estimates suggest that a reallocation of government spending from RME to PME 
expenditures results in a faster rate of per capita GDP growth while the effect of total 
government expenditures is insignificant. It may be that the increase in total 
government coupled with a rise in taxes is what renders the effect of total government 
insignificant. Therefore, as a robustness check, we included the share of taxes over 
GDP as an additional control. Both total government and total taxes over GDP 
remained statistically insignificant. The findings that total government expenditures 
have non-positive effects on growth and the share of PME spending has a positive and 





We first test whether the residuals of the estimations are in fact time independent as is 
required for the TVC-FE to be a valid approach. Table 1 reports p-values of the test, 
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which shows that time trend variable for the estimation ( )it constant trndμ β= + is 
statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the assumption that the itμ  error 
component is uncorrelated with time, which suggests that the third order polynomial 
function of time used is a good approximation for the time-varying country-
idiosyncratic effects.  Next we test for the validity of the standard TWFE estimators by 
testing the null hypothesis 1 2 3 0i i ib b b= = = for all i, using a maximum likelihood ratio 
test. As shown in Table 1, the restricted model is rejected by a broad margin meaning 
that the TVC-FE model should be preferred over standard TWFE model.  
We also conducted further analysis on the time-varying country specific effects. 
The estimated predicted value of the itν function is positive for 49 countries, which 
implies that the unobserved variables tend to improve per capita GDP growth. The 
predicted values of itν are time monotonic for 33 countries. For 23 countries the growth 
effect of the time-varying effects has just one turning point over time, while for 16 




3.3.2 TVC-FE-SUR approach: estimating the growth and investment equations 
jointly 
The single equation estimation reported above yields a partial effect on growth because 
we are controlling for investment. The fact that the effect of investment on growth is 
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positive and significant (under most estimates) means that it is possible that RME may 
increase investments and that this investment effect may dominate over the negative 
direct effect of RME on economic growth. Below we report the results of the joint 
estimation of the growth equation and investment equations. This serves a dual role: 
first it provides insights about the investment effects allowing us to compute the total 
net effects of PME and RME on growth considering both their direct or productivity 
impact and indirect effect via investment. Second, it serves as a robustness test to the 
estimates obtained using single-equation methods.  
Table 2 reports the results of the TVC-FE-SUR estimation of the growth and 
investment equations. These results fully corroborate the finding for growth using the 
single equation approach just reported. In fact, the effects of the two government 
spending variables on the per capita GDP growth rate are similar to the effects obtained 
using single equation specification. Also, the coefficient of the 1itpme −  variable on 
investment is positive and statistically significant but the coefficient of the 1itq − variable 
is insignificant. These two results combined imply that the net effect of PME on 




Further disaggregating government spending 
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Table 3 presents the results of the TVC-FE-SUR estimation using further disaggregated 
spending components. PME spending is split into social subsidies and non-social public 
goods, and we also include RME spending specific to economic affairs (excluding 
transport and communication) in the specification. Economic affairs include mostly 
agricultural, forestry, fishing, mining, manufacturing, construction, fuel and energy 
subsidies. The omitted spending category is other RME spending, which mostly 
consists of national defense spending. Consistent with the predictions from the 
theoretical model, the results indicate that social subsidies mainly account for the 
positive direct (controlling for investments) effects of PME spending on economic 
growth. Non-social public goods (comprised mostly of infrastructure spending) have an 
insignificant direct effect on growth, although their effect on investment is positive and 
significant.  With respect to RME spending, it has a negative effect on economic growth 
when using second order approximation for the function itν . However, this significance 
is lost when we use third order approximation. 
The estimates generally are consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
spending on social goods partially mitigates households’ credit constraints thus 
allowing for faster human capital accumulation. This raises the rate of economic growth 
to the extent that the enhanced human capital contributes to accelerate the rate of total 
factor productivity, which, in turn, causes greater returns to investment and hence 
higher investment levels.  The estimates in Table 3 fully support this interpretation; the 
estimated effects of social public goods (reported in the first row of the Table) on both 
economic growth and investment are positive and highly significant in all cases 
considered. Also, the positive and significant effect of non-social public goods on total 
156 
 
investment is plausible given that infrastructure spending is a significant component of 
non-social public good spending and thus likely to complement private investment. As 
shown in Table 3, the estimated effects of public infrastructure are much greater than 
the participation of government investment in total investment, which suggests that a 
large portion of the effect of increasing government spending in infrastructure on total 
investment may be attributed to its effect on private investment.25  
 
3.3.3 Potential dynamic effects: GMM approach   
So far we have assumed that economic growth is not affected by inertia, which could 
require using a dynamic panel approach. We thus use the Arellano-Bond two-step 
procedure “System” Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); results are shown in 
Table A4. We used both collapsed and un-collapsed instruments26. The GMM 
procedure mitigates potential reverse causality biases of the explanatory variables that 
may exist in the determination of GDP per capita growth. One variable of concern is 
investment over GDP, which is not lagged in the empirical specification. However the 
GMM estimate in Table A4 for the effect of Investment over GDP is positive and 
highly significant and only moderately lower than the estimates in Table 2. The 
estimates for the 1itpme −  variable are positive and significant at 1% while the 
coefficient of the 1itq − variable remains statistically insignificant. Finally, the lagged 
                                                     
25 Aggregate investments include public investment in infrastructure which in the sample accounts for 
about 8% of total GDP on average. In Table 3 the estimated elasticity of the effect of public investment 
on total investment is about 0.196 when the third order approximation for itν is used. This effect is thus 
more than double the participation of public investment on GDP. 
26 Collapsing the instruments imply creating one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather 
than one instrument for each time period, variable, and lag distance (Roodman, 2006) 
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dependent variable is not statistically significant suggesting that the approaches 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 that ignore dynamic effects are correct.27 Thus the GMM 
estimators are highly consistent with the single-equation and SUR estimates reported 
earlier.   
3.3.4 Robustness Analyses 
While the main results are robust to the methods of estimation the actual specifications 
used may be considered excessively parsimonious by failing to explicitly control for 
other variables that could affect the results. We address this issue by using a battery of 
robustness checks described below. 
Added Controls Approach  
Several studies have emphasized that governance and institutions (Rodrik et. al, 2004; 
Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002), human capital and income distribution (Esteban and Ray, 
2006; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), and demographics and 
geography (Sachs et al., 1999), are potential important determinants of economic 
growth. We sequentially introduce one set of variables representing each of the 
determinants listed above in the TWFE and TWRE base models estimations.  Table 4 
shows how the effect of 1itpme − on per capita GDP growth rate changes with different 
sets of control variables. A set of added control variables raises the explanatory power 
of the estimation if the adjusted R-squared increases relative to the base level. Adding 
                                                     
27 The Hansen test indicates that the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected and thus instruments as 
a group are exogenous. The AR(2) test indicates there is no further serial correlation at all levels of 




variables representing demography increase the explanatory power of the TWFE 
estimates with respect to the basic model. For all sets of controls, the explanatory 
power of the TWRE estimates increase. The sign and significance of the coefficient of 
the 1itpme − variable is unaffected no matter what set of variables are included. Moreover, 
the lack of significance of the 1itq − variable on per capita GDP growth rate (not reported 
in the Table) also remains.  
Country Heterogeneity 
Despite that the use of TVC-FE estimators appears to control well for time-varying and 
fixed country heterogeneity we conducted a simple test to confirm this. We ranked all 
the countries in the sample according to average GDP per capita over the sample 
period. We then dropped the top and bottom countries, and re-estimated the 
coefficients. We started by dropping one country at each end and then two countries at 
each end and so forth until we dropped 30 countries at each end ending with a 
“homogenous” sample of just 23 middle income countries. The idea is to verify 
whether the coefficients sign and significance change as the degree of country 
heterogeneity gradually decreases. The coefficient of the 1itpme − variable remains 
positive and statistically significant throughout the full process. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the 1itq − variable remains statistically insignificant in almost all cases. In 
addition, the estimates obtained using only the top half of the sample and developing 
countries only also remain qualitatively identical.28   
                                                     
28 Further sensitivity tests are available in the Online Appendix 
(http://www.arec.umd.edu/People/Faculty/Lopez_ Ramon/OnlineAppendix.pdf): We omitted from the 
sample observations for the top and bottom 5% values of share of PME expenditure, and the estimates 
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3.3.5 Quantitative importance of the effects of PME and RME on growth 
Increasing the share of PME in total government spending has two effects on the rate of 
economic growth, a direct one shown in column 3 of Table 2, which reflects mostly the 
effect of PME on productivity growth for a given level of investment and an indirect 
one through its effect on investment as shown in column 4 of table 2.  According to the 
estimates using the two-equation SUR reported in the last two columns of Table 2, the 
direct or productivity effect of increasing the share of PME in total government 
spending by one standard deviation of the sample (an increase from the observed 
average of 54% of total spending to 69%) increases the annual per capita GDP growth 
rate by 0.83 percentage points when evaluated at the mean sample values. Additionally, 
the above increase of PME induces a rise in the rate of investment of about 0.67 
percentage points that in turn is translated into a further increase of the per capita GDP 
growth of the order of 0.05 percentage points. Thus, the total effect of a one standard 
deviation increase of PME considering its productivity and investment effects is to 
expand the rate of per capita GDP growth by about 0.9 percentage points. The total 
effect is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. 
To assess the importance of this effect consider that the average annual per 
capita GDP growth rate for the whole sample is 1.9%. Thus, increasing the 
participation of PME in total government spending by one standard deviation would 
raise the annual rate of per capita GDP growth from 1.9% to 2.8%.  The 0.9 percentage 
                                                                                                                                                           
were still significant for all estimating models. We also tested for country dominance by dropping one 




point increase on the growth rate that the rise of PME induces is equivalent to almost 
one third of the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the sample. 
The insignificance of the effects of total government spending on both per 
capita GDP growth and investment rate implies that the effects of RME on growth and 
investment are practically equal to the effect of PME but with an opposite sign. That is, 
RME expenditures exert a negative and significant effect on economic growth.  Raising 
RME by 15 percentage points induces the annual per capita GDP growth rate to fall by 
about 0.9 percentage points. Thus, the results show that while increasing social 
subsidies and public goods promote faster economic growth, spending on non-social 
subsidies is toxic for economic growth.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has shown that switching fiscal expenditures from non-social subsidies to 
social subsidies and public goods, keeping total government spending constant, 
promotes faster economic growth. Keeping the composition of government spending 
constant, increasing total government spending does not promote growth or investment. 
Increased total government spending entails increasing both social and public goods as 
well as non-social subsidies by the same proportion. This means that the positive 
growth effects of social and public goods spending are likely offset by the toxic effect 
of non-social government spending. 
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In addition, we have shown that within PME, the most important effect on 
economic growth and on investment is associated with social government expenditures, 
thus supporting our key hypothesis, that social expenditures by partially mitigating 
credit market failures affecting households’ investment in human capital, induce a 
faster rate of total factor productivity growth, which in turn, is translated in a permanent 
raise of the rate of economic growth.   These findings are important because most 
countries spend a large fraction (40% on average in our sample) on private subsidies. 
The basic results passed broad and rigorous sensitivity tests with great 
consistency. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the quantitative effects are large.  The 
average country may increase its growth rate by almost 50% if it raises its share of 
social and public good expenditures by about 30%. This is a large effect that could, 
after a few decades, make the difference between development and underdevelopment.  
Should this large impact be astonishing? Given that governments spend more 
than one third of national income, a misallocation of part of such expenditures can be 
expected to have large consequences.  Wasting 10% or more of the total output 
produced by the economy is a serious issue. Using such an enormous amount of 
resources in subsidies that are at best ineffective and at worst toxic for growth instead 
of allocating them to enhance the potential for creativity of individuals, in health care 
and better infrastructure is likely to be highly deleterious for economic growth.  
The findings in this paper provide an encouraging message. Economic crises, 
which have often given governments an opportunity to correct fiscal spending 
misallocation built up during “normal” times may have a positive dividend for 
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countries that use the opportunity to restructure fiscal spending towards social goods  
that are more consistent with a faster rate of  economic growth over the medium run. 
This is consistent with casual evidence that some countries that emerge from deep 



















Table 2: Government Spending and per capita GDP Growth – System Estimators 
  
TVC-FE-SUR 
with 2nd order approximation of 




with 3rd order approximation of itν  and 
itν  





GDP per Capita Growth Investment 
over GDP 
 
Share of government PME in total 










[0.025] [0.034] [0.025] [0.035] 
Total government consumption 
expenditures over GDP (lagged) 
 
-0.09 0.027 -0.056 0.084 
[0.078] [0.106] [0.068] [0.096] 
Total investment over GDP 
 
 
0.124***  0.084**  
[0.038]  [0.037]  
Real GDP per capita growth (lagged) 
 
 0.296***  0.200*** 
 [0.054]  
 [0.049] 
Country dummies x time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies x (time trend)2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies x (time trend)3 No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 357 357 357 357 
Number of countries 83 83 83 83 
 
Specification Test29     
Test for fixed country effect model 
Ho: 1 2 3 0,i i i for all ib b b= = =  
Log Likelihood Ratio Test 
896*** 1206*** 
Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. All estimates include time period dummies 
common to all countries. TVC estimates include 212 and 254 country specific coefficients for the first 2 columns and last 2 
columns respectively, to capture the itν  effects. 
 







                                                     
29 Similar to the TVC-FE estimates in table 1, we found that the residuals for the TVC-FE-SUR estimates 









with 2nd order approximation of itν  




with 3rd order approximation of itν  and 
itν  









Share of government PME social 
spending in total government 










[0.027] [0.038] [0.026] [0.040] 
Share of government PME non-social 
public good spending in total 
government Expenditures (lagged)  
 
0.052 0.170** -0.049 0.196** 
[0.058] [0.080] [0.056] [0.083] 
Share of government RME economic 




-0.116*** -0.018 -0.047 0.002 
[0.032] [0.045] [0.036] [0.054] 
Total government consumption 
expenditures over GDP (lagged) 
 
-0.160** 0.021 -0.125* 0.101 
[0.079] [0.110] [0.067] [0.101] 
Total investment over GDP 
 
 
0.114***  0.123***  
[0.037]  [0.035]  
Real GDP per capita growth (lagged) 
 
 
 0.291***  0.169*** 
 [0.055]  [0.052] 
Country dummies x time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies x (time trend)2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies x (time trend)3 No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 354 354 354 354 
Number of countries 83 83 83 83 
 
Specification Test30     
Test for fixed country effect model 
Ho: 1 2 3 0,i i i for all ib b b= = =  
Log Likelihood Ratio Test 
875*** 1200*** 
Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. All estimates include time period dummies common to 
all countries. TVC estimates include 212 and 254 country specific coefficients for the first 2 columns and last 2 columns 
respectively, to capture the itν  effects. 
 






                                                     
30 Similar to the TVC-FE estimates in table 1, we found that the residuals for the TVC-FE-SUR estimates 





Table 4: Added Controls Approach (ACA) 
 
 Two Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) 
 


























Added  Control Sets 
 
Governance and Institutions  
Presidential System Dummy 
Quality of Government  
Corruption 
Polity Index lagged 
Political Competition lagged 




















Stability   
Years of Democratic Stability lagged 
Log of (1+black market premium) – 1980-89 
Average 






Human Capital and Income Distribution 
Gini of Education 
Initial Income Gini 
Initial Primary School Completion Rate 
Life Expectancy  






Demographics and Geography 
Labor force size 
Population Density  







Trade over GDP 






Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. All estimates include time period dummies common to 











Table A1: Variable Sources, Definitions And Countries in Sample 
 
Variable Description Years Available Source 
 
 
GDP growth (2000 US$)    Real GDP per Capita growth (Constant US$ 2000) 
 
1980 – 2009 World Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank (WDI) 
Share of Government 
Expenditure on PME 
Include:  (1) Subsidies to Households: Education, 
Health, Social security and welfare, Housing and 
community amenities (2) Environmental 
Protection, Research and development (3) “Pure” 
Public Goods: Transport, Communication, Public 
order and safety (4) Other public goods - Religion 
and culture 
 





Share of Government 
Consumption over GDP 
 1980 – 2009 Penn World Tables 
(2011) 
  
Share of Investment over 
GDP 
 1980 – 2009 Penn World Tables 
(2011) 
  





Years of Schooling Average Years of Schooling of Population over 15 1980-2009 (5 year 
interval) 






Trade Openness Log of Total Trade of GDP 1980-2009 WDI 
Population Density  1980-2009 WDI 
Labor Force Size Population between 15 and 64 1980-2009 WDI 
Income Gini  1980-2009 WDI 
Education Gini Education Gini for total population age 15 and 
over 
1980-2000 Thomas et. al 
(2001) 
Primary School Completion 
Rate 
 1980-2009 WDI 
Life Expectancy  1980-2009 WDI 
Presidential Dummy 1 if system is considered presidential. 1980-2009 Database of 
Political Institutions 
(DPI) 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 









Quality of Government 
Index 
mean value of the ICRG governance variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy 
Quality”, scaled 0-1 
1980-2009 International 
Country Risk Guide 




Index of Democracy 
(Polity 2) 
Score that indicates how democratic a country 
ranging between -10 and 10  




Years of Democratic 
Stability 
Square root of Durability of Polity if Polity 2>0 1980-2009 From Polity IV and 






Political Competition Index 10-point scale where higher values indicate more 
competition. 
 
1980-2009 From Polity IV and 








Dollar and Kraay 
2002 
Logarithm of (1+black 
market premium) 
 1980-89 Average Dollar and Kraay 
2002 
Primary export share of total 
exports in 1970 
  Dollar and Kraay 
2002 
% Land in Tropics   Sachs, Gallup, and 
Mellinger (1999) 
Country List   
Developing: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic 
Rep, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong-China, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea Rep., Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 




Table A2: Summary Statistics, 5 Year Averages, 1980-2009 
 
Variable Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Growth of Per Capita GDP 1.9 2.6 -7.6 9.8 
Share of Government PME in Total Government 
Expenditures (lagged) 54.3 15.3 14.1 84.1 
Share of Total Government Consumption over GDP 
(lagged) 9.3 4.8 2.9 36.9 
Share of Investment over GDP 21.9 7.6 6.3 59.6 
Tax over GDP 17.7 8.0 1.0 56.8 
Years of Schooling 7.4 2.7 0.5 12.7 
% Land In Tropics 6.8 41.1 0.0 100.0 
Index of Democracy 
(Polity 2) 8 6.7 -9.0 10.0 
Political Competition Index 9 3.4 0.5 10.0 
Years of Democratic Stability 2.8 3.5 0.0 13.9 
Population aged between 15 and 64 (in millions) 6.8 68.6 0.36 710 
Initial Income Gini 36.1 10.9 19.4 74.3 
Population Density 66.0 727.4 1.5 6615.6 
Presidential Dummy   0 1 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 4.6 2.4 1.7 9.6 
Quality of Government Index 0.6 0.2 0.1 1 
Average number of revolutions 0.1 0.3 0 2 
Logarithm of (1+black market premium) 0.1 0.7 -0.01 6.9 
Education Gini 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.9 
Primary School Completion Rate 92.6 18.3 13.6 109.3 
Life Expectancy 71.8 8.6 39.8 82.2 
Primary export share of total exports in 1970 80 31.4 1 100 




Table A3: Composition Of Government Expenditures (% Of Total Spending) 
 
 PME expenditures RME expenditures 
 Social Subsidies Other PME Subsidies to Firms 









1990-1999  47 9 45 
2000-2009  51 9 40 
    
Top Third (based on PME)  64 7 28 
Middle Third 48 9 43 
Bottom Third  
 
29 10 63 
PME: Top 3 countries     
Slovenia 71 9 20 
New Zealand 72 8 21 
Croatia 65 12 22 
PME: Bottom 3 countries     
Syrian Arab Republic 18 4 77 
South Africa 18 9 73 
Peru 22 5 72 
Social subsidies include Education, Health, Social Security and welfare, Public Housing, Religion and Culture, 
and social transfers. Other PME include: Environmental Protection, Research and Development, Public Order and 
Safety, Transport and Communication. Direct subsidies to firms include Economic Affairs (excluding Transport 
and Communication). Administration expenditures are included in each category. 
     
 






Share of government PME in total 







Total government consumption expenditures 



















Lagged GDP per Capita Growth 0.043 0.077 
[0.060] [0.065] 
 





Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 0.206 0.248 
Number of Observations 369 369 
Number of Countries 95 95 
Significant at *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%, Unit of observation: 5 year averages. Robust standard errors in brackets; All 





APPENDIX I. Chapter 3: Proof of Lemmas 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Part (i). The worker maximizes the present discounted value of her utility over period 0 
( 0( )u c ) and period 1 ( 1( ) /(1  )u c ρ+ ) by choosing the optimal levels of borrowing ( B ) 
and a dollar value equal to h of investment in human capital in period 0, subject to the 
budget constraints in period 0 0 0 0( )c w s B h= + + −  In period 1 the worker does not 
invest and thus the budget constraint is 1 (1 ( )) (1 )
fc h w r Bψ= + − + ). 1c  and 0c  denote 
the levels of consumption in period 0 and 1 respectively, ρ is the time discount rate, 
and 0w  is the market wage rate for unskilled workers in period 0. Unconstrained 
workers can borrow ( 0B ≥ ) while constrained workers cannot ( 0B = ).  Assuming an 
interior solution, the first order conditions for the financially-unconstrained workers 
(i.e., those with 0s s≥ ) are: 
(B1)                      0 1'( ) ((1 ) /(1 )) '( ) 0
fu c r u cρ− + + = ,      
(B2)                      0 0 1'( ) ( '( ) /(1 )) '( ) 0u c h w u cψ ρ− + + = . 
Combining (B1) and (B2) yields,  
(B3)                                        0'( ) 1
u fh w rψ = + . 
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 Equation (B3) implies that an unconstrained worker’s human capital investment is 
unaffected by her initial wealth level ( 0/ 0
uh s∂ ∂ = ). Financially-constrained workers 
are affected by a binding borrowing restriction, which implies that the marginal net 
present value of the utility of B is positive. Therefore,  
 (B4)                    0 1'( ) ((1 ) /(1 )) '( ) 0
fu c r u cρ− + + > .      
(B2) holds for financially-constrained workers as long as their human capital 
investment is positive ( 0ch > ). The marginal cost of investing in h for financially-
constrained workers equals their own internal marginal cost of saving 
( 0 1'( )(1 ) / '( )u c u cρ+ ) and for financially-unconstrained workers it equals the market 
cost of capital (1+ fr ). By (B4) the internal marginal cost of money is higher than the 
market cost of capital. Thus, using (B2) and (B4) we get,  
(B5)                                        0( ) 1
c fh w rψ ′ > + . 
This implies that '( ) '( )c uh hψ ψ> . By assumption A.4, 2 2/ 0hψ∂ ∂ < , which implies 
that ( ) ( )u ch hψ ψ> . ⊗  
Part (ii). The internal marginal cost of money, 0 1'( )(1 ) / '( )u c u cρ+ , is decreasing in the 
level of wealth, 0s . The strict concavity of ( )hψ  in human capital investment ( )h  
implies 0/ 0
ch s∂ ∂ > . Hence, human capital investment by financially-constrained 
workers is increasing in their level of initial wealth.⊗  
Proof of Lemma 3 
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Part (i). From the profit maximization for unconstrained firms, we have the first order 
condition with respect to labor or  human capital: 
           (B6)                                      2 ( / )j jaf l k w= ,    
where 2f denotes the first derivative with respect to human capital. 2f is homogenous of 
degree zero and thus expressed as a function of the factor ratio ( /j jl k ). Let own 
financial capital for constrained and unconstrained firms be 0cχ ≥ and 
0uχ ≥ respectively, so that for financially-unconstrained (constrained) firms total initial 
wealth is u kχ ≥ ( c kχ < ), where k is the minimum critical level of total owned wealth 
by the firm for accessing capital markets.  Constrained firms can choose labor freely, as 
the financial constraint does not affect their choice of variable inputs, and are assumed 
to face the same composite wage rate as financially-unconstrained firms. Hence, 
financially-constrained firms will maximize profit by equalizing the marginal product 
of human capital to the market wage rate, 
           (B7)                                           2 ( / )j jaf l k w= . 
 
From equations (B6) and (B7) it follows that as long as unconstrained and constrained 
firms face the same wage rate, the financially constrained firms reach the same human 
capital/physical capital ratio as the unconstrained firms, ( / ) ( / )E Ec c j jl l kχ = . ⊗  
Part (ii). From the profit maximization for unconstrained firms, we have the first order 
condition with respect to physical capital: 
 
(B8)                                           1( / )
f
j jaf l k r= , 
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where 1f  is  the first derivative of f  with respect to physical capital. 1f is homogenous 
of degree zero and thus 1f  can also be expressed as a function of only /j jl k . Thus, 
from condition (B8) we obtain, 
(B9)                                            ( / ) ( / )E fj jl k r aφ= , 
where the function φ is increasing in /fr a .  Using (B9) in (B6) we obtain the 
equilibrium composite wage rate, 
          (B10)                                          ( , / )E E fw w a r a= , 
where Ew is increasing in a and decreasing in fr . ⊗  
Part (iii). From the profit maximization for unconstrained firms, we have the first order 
condition with respect to human capital and physical capital employed in rent seeking 
activities: 
(B11)                                     1( / , / )
M M f
j jR k M l M r=  
           (B12)                                     2 ( / , / ) ,
M M E
j jR k M l M w=  
where 1R and 2R denote the first derivatives with respect to physical capital and human 
capital employed in rent seeking activities, respectively. The marginal products of the 
factors of production devoted to rent seeking are functions of the /Mjk M and 
/Mjl M ratios because the function ( , ; )
M M
j jR k l M is linearly homogenous. Equations 
(B11) and (B12) then solve, 
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            (B13)                (a)   / ( , )M L E fjl M w rζ= ;      (b)   / ( , )
M K E f
jk M w rζ=   
Where ( )L Kζ ζ is decreasing (increasing) in Ew , and increasing (decreasing) in fr . ⊗   
Proof of Lemma 6  
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function for the economy is 
                                                
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )[ (1 ) ]j j jy a k l
σσ σ
σσ σα α
− − −− − −= + − , 
where 1σ < is the elasticity of substitution. From lemma 3(i) and lemma 3(ii) we have,  
(B14)                                    
1 (1 )
( / ) ( / ) /(1 )
f
E E







−− −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
⎢ ⎥= = − −⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 , 
Using (B14) in (4) and (5) we obtain, 










−− −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
⎢ ⎥− = − −⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
;                (B16)   
( )1 /f EY a r Kσσ α−=  
By logarithmically differentiating (B15) and (B16) with respect to time, we derive the 
following growth specifications in lemma 6: ( )
S M fk L L a rg g g gσϖ−= + − , and 
(1 )
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